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Marriage settlements are back. Complex trusts intended to protect family fortunes were 
once the centerpiece of wedding planning and family negotiations. In more modern times, these 
trust-based settlements ceded their popularity to premarital contracting and the prenuptial 
agreement. But in recent years, new trust forms with unprecedented asset protection features 
have prompted a resurgence of trust usage in marriage planning. Playing on notions of family 
money and legacy building, these new trusts function much like their predecessors, except in 
one noteworthy respect. Conventional trusts have always provided asset protection based on 
the notion of third-party freedom of disposition. The new marriage trusts give asset protection 
to trusts created by a first-party to the marriage. Accordingly, one spouse can create an asset 
protection trust—for his or her exclusive benefit using what is potentially marital property—
without the knowledge of the other spouse. That individual spouses are seeking new ways to 
protect wealth is not necessarily surprising. Nevertheless, the new powers being given to 
individual spouses to shelter assets within marriage are alarming. In practice, the new trusts 
are disconcerting because they allow for a significant amount of unilateral decision-making. In 
theory, the new trusts are troubling because they disrupt the precarious equilibrium that exists 
between two competing “value-spheres”: family wealth preservation and marital partnership. 
This Article proposes a distinctive framework, based on the notion of competing value-spheres, 
for assessing the growing phenomenon of asset protection trusts in marriage and concludes that 
these trusts represent an aggressive incursion of wealth preservation into the realm of modern 
marital partnership. That is to say, the new asset protection trusts undermine the values of 
personal trust and financial transparency within marriage.  
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TRUSTING MARRIAGE 
Allison Tait* 
I would have everybody marry if they can do it properly; I do not like to 
have people throw themselves away; but everybody should marry as soon 
as they can do it to advantage.  
 ~ Jane Austen, Mansfield Park (1814) 
Equity will not feed the husband and starve the wife. 
 ~ Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N.Y. 520, 529 (1896) 
INTRODUCTION 
Marriage settlements are back. Intricate trusts, especially popular with the 
landed aristocracy in early modern England, were once an integral part of wedding 
preparations and parental negotiations.1 Elaborate arrangements specified a bride’s 
dowry and carved out a small amount of the estate for her widowhood.2 These 
agreements also stipulated what assets would return to the spouse’s family of origin 
at death if there were no heirs to carry on the family line.3 Building family fortunes 
and protecting legacies was the name of the game. Furthermore, families routinely 
took steps to insulate their assets from the reach of a spouse during marriage in case 
the spouse turned out to be an unabashed spendthrift. Summing up this approach, 
Samuel Johnson stated: “It is mighty foolish to let a stranger have [your estate] 
because he married your daughter.”4 
The trust, with its unique capacity for asset partitioning, was central to this 
type of estate planning.5 The trust accommodated the desire of families to safeguard 
their fortunes by allowing assets to be made available for the benefit of one spouse 
 
         * Assistant Professor, University of Richmond, School of Law. For comments and conversation, 
I would like to thank Erez Aloni, Susan Appleton, Alex Boni-Saenz, Stephanie Bornstein, Naomi Cahn, 
Jessica Clarke, Erin Collins, Bridget Crawford, James Dwyer, Jessica Erickson, Deborah Gordon, 
Andrew Gilden, Meredith Harbach, Claudia Haupt, Mary Heen, Rana Jaleel, Corinna Lain, William 
LaPiana, Serena Mayeri, Shari Motro, Luke Norris, Robert Pollak, Rachel Rebouche, Carla Spivack, Ed 
Stein, Sarah Swan, and Lee-Ford Tritt. I benefitted greatly from panel participants at the Law and 
Society 2017 Annual Conference, the 2017 Association for Law, Culture, and Humanities conference, 
and SEALS 2017 panel on trusts & estates, as well as faculty workshop participants at Washington 
University, William & Mary Law School and St. John’s University School of Law. For excellent research 
and editorial assistance, I thank Amanda Bird and Michelle Fremen. 
1. Christopher Clay, Marriage, Inheritance, and the Rise of Large Estates in England, 1660-1815, 
21 ECON. HIST. REV. 503, 504 (1968). 
2. H.J. Habakkuk, Marriage Settlements in the Eighteenth Century, 32 TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 15, 20–21 (1950). 
3. For discussion and debate on early-modern marriage settlements, see AMY LOUISE 
ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 79–114 (1993); EILEEN SPRING, 
LAW, LAND, AND FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN ENGLAND 1300 TO 1800, 123–48 (1993); 
SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN’S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN ENGLAND, 1660-1833, Chapter 6 
(1990); Clay, supra note 1, at 507, 510; Habakkuk, supra note 2, at 22. 
4.  JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 520 (1904). 
5. On the use of trusts in these settlements, see generally LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE 
SETTLEMENTS, 1601-1740 (1883). 
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but not the other. Most commonly, a father created a trust for his child upon 
marriage. However, there were many variations: an aunt with no husband or 
children created a trust in her will for her favorite nephew or a grandfather created 
a trust for a granddaughter as a wedding gift. The connecting thread was that a 
family member created the trust with non-marital assets to benefit one spouse 
during his or her marriage.  
In the twentieth century, these elaborate marriage settlements passed out of 
fashion, replaced by prenuptial agreements and premarital contracting.6 In the last 
several decades, however, a new breed of asset protection trusts has proliferated 
and revitalized the use of trusts in marital financial planning.7 And, as more and 
more states modify traditional trust rules, new types of asset protection trusts appear 
every day, playing on notions of family money and legacy building. Dynasty Trusts.8 
Legacy Trusts.9 Millennium Trusts.10 There is a “Bloodline Trust.”11 And one trust 
company even boldly markets a “Have Your Cake and Eat It Too” Trust (HYCET 
Trust®).12 These trusts function much like their predecessors—except in one 
noteworthy respect. The new marriage trusts allow one spouse acting alone to create 
asset protection trusts for his or her personal benefit with assets that are potentially 
marital property.  
 
6. Prenuptial contracts are an alternate form of marriage settlement, and contracting has been 
the more usual method of protecting assets within marriage starting in the twentieth century. The first 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act was introduced in 1983. Recent estimates suggest that between 3-
5% of marrying couples have these kinds of contracts. Interesting Prenuptial Agreement Statistics (May 
20, 2017), http://brandongaille.com/18-interesting-prenuptial-agreement-statistics [perma.cc/2HZR-
3YMR] (“Only 3% of people who have a spouse or are planning on getting married in the near future 
have a prenuptial agreement.”). 
7. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Beyond the Prenup: Families Increasingly Turn to Trust to Protect 
Assets, Inheritances From Ex-Spouses, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB112735445722148247 [perma.cc/6MYB-6QT8] (explaining that “[p]rotecting wealth from 
the financial ravages of divorce has long been a key concern of families”). 
8. The Dynasty Trust, WILMINGTON TR. CORP., https://www.wilmingtontrust.com/wtcom/
index.jsp?fileid=3000303 [perma.cc/Z383-7CEV] ( last visited July 16, 2017) (explaining that “a 
dynasty trust is an irrevocable trust designed so that it may stay in effect for multiple generations, 
creating a powerful estate planning tool for high-net-worth families”). 
 9. Christopher  Cline,  Why  Use  Legacy  Trusts,  ABBOT  DOWNING, https://www.abbot 
downing.com/asset/ggckc8/LegacyTrusts.pdf [perma.cc/MCZ3 - NCWL] ( last visited July 16, 2017) 
(explaining that legacy trust is a term for any trust that last perpetually). 
10. Trusts to Consider, PEAK TR. COMPANY, https://www.peaktrust.com/trustee/trusts-to-
consider/ [perma.cc/3TPQ-JA84] ( last visited July 16, 2017) (explaining that “perpetual trust[s] 
(Millennium Trust) provide for a long-term trust that saves estate and gift taxes while increasing the 
family wealth, using Alaska jurisdiction”).  
11. The Benefits of Bloodline Trusts Special Report, BEGLEY L. GROUP, 
http://www.begleylawyer.com/2012/02/the-benefits-of-bloodline-trusts-special-report/ [perma.cc/ 
UC2R-H9AY] ( last visited July 16, 2017) (explaining that a bloodline trust is designed to keep money 
in the family protecting the inheritance of your children and their descendants). 
12. Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Hycet Trust, JEFFERY M. VERDON L. GROUP, LLP, 
http://jmvlaw.com/hycet-trust/ [perma.cc/ABH4-AD4D] ( last visited July 16, 2017) [hereinafter 
HYCET]. 
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That individual spouses are seeking new ways to protect family wealth is not 
surprising. The new powers being given to spouses to shelter their own assets are, 
nevertheless, decidedly problematic both in practice and in theory. In practice, the 
new trusts are problematic because they allow for significant amounts of unilateral 
decision-making by one spouse in terms of trust creation and management. This 
unilateral decision-making authority may strip spouses of their rights by allowing 
one spouse to create a trust with assets that are potentially marital property. In this 
way, the new trusts financially endanger economically vulnerable spouses by 
manipulating the marital estate and removing family law protections crafted to 
address wealth and income asymmetries in marriage.13  
In theory, the new marriage trusts are troubling because they disrupt the 
current equilibrium—already precarious—between family wealth preservation and 
marital partnership. In previous centuries, family wealth preservation, with its focus 
on minimizing wealth passing to the surviving spouse and maximizing bloodline 
inheritance, was the lodestar of all wealth management in marriage. In modern 
marriage, however, norms concerning marriage and money have evolved and 
economic partnership has replaced the duty of support as the conceptual 
touchstone of marriage. Accordingly, the spouse is no longer ancillary to wealth 
transmission and the idea of a surviving spouse inheriting the bulk of a married 
couple’s wealth has become commonplace.14 As a result, family wealth preservation 
values have been forced to compete and compromise with marital partnership 
values in the regulation of the marital economy. 
Put another way, as marital partnership has gained traction and become 
increasingly embedded in marriage law, economic partnership and family wealth 
preservation have come to represent two forceful and often competing “value-
spheres,” each constituted by distinct ideals.15 Each value-sphere conceives of 
wealth management and transfer differently, and each operates according to a 
particular regulatory logic: money has a distinct meaning in each realm. That these 
two different spheres exist is not an intractable problem; the landscape is replete 
with different value-spheres, each regulating a particular slice of life. It is, however, 
a problem when the rules of one value-sphere aggressively impose themselves on 
another. This is exactly what is happening with the new trust forms. Because the 
new marriage trusts not only facilitate spousal disinheritance but also enable this 
asset stripping to happen at the hands of a spouse rather than a third party, the new 
 
13. Traditionally, the lack of economic protections in marriage disproportionately affected 
women and contributed to female impoverishment after divorce from or the death of a spouse. In many 
instances, however, women are consumers of these new trusts, shielding assets from their husbands in 
order to protect their own wealth. In addition, differences in income and wealth are also present in 
same-sex marriages, rendering both men and women in these marriages vulnerable as well. From this 
perspective, the gender of the economically vulnerable spouse is a secondary concern, although there 
is surely more to say about how the role of “economically vulnerable spouse” is likely gendered female.  
14. Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law 
Provides a Solution, 49 UNIV. OF MIAMI L. REV. 567, 573 (1995). 
15. See discussion infra Section I.C. 
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marriage trusts represent an unwelcome incursion of family wealth preservation 
rules into the sphere of marital partnership.  
In tackling the problems created by these new marriage trusts, this Article 
builds on several strands of scholarship. Scholars have addressed the gap between 
the partnership theory of marriage and inheritance law in the context of the elective 
share and Uniform Probate Code (UPC) reform.16 These scholars have examined 
changes to probate rules and debated how well the new rules instantiate the value 
of economic partnership, which the UPC claims as a guiding value. This project 
shifts the theoretical focus from probate to trust law and subsequently looks at the 
inherent value conflict between trust and family law. This Article also contributes 
to an emerging body of scholarship analyzing recent developments in trust law, in 
particular, the appearance of the latest asset protection trusts. In this vein, scholars 
are addressing emergent legal questions related to domestic asset protection and 
dynasty trusts, including questions about choice of law, fraudulent transfer, and 
bankruptcy.17 Scholars are exploring the normative correctness of states authorizing 
such trusts and the public policy questions involved.18 This Article threads together 
these strands of scholarship in order to better understand how new trust forms are 
impacting wealth transfer between couples and within families and what the proper 
regulation of these trusts should be. Moreover, this Article proposes a distinctive 
framework, based on the notion of competing value-spheres, for assessing the 
current intervention of trust law into marriage law and concludes that first-party 
trusts are an invalid incursion of wealth preservation into the realm of modern 
marriage values. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part One provides a broad history of the 
norms of family wealth planning and how they shifted in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. This Part begins with a description of the ways in which estate 
planning historically involved providing for heirs and gave little weight to spousal 
rights. Subsequently, I discuss evolving social norms and legal rules within marriage 
and the emergence of the partnership theory of marriage. After providing this 
background, I introduce the concept of value-spheres and propose a framework for 
analyzing the conflict between family wealth preservation and marital partnership 
based on these value-spheres. Part Two begins with an analysis of the basic 
 
16. See also Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce and Death, 4 UTAH  
L. REV. 1227 (2005). See generally Gary, supra note 14, at 567 (1995).  
17. See Nina Dow, The Hide and Seek of Creditors & Debtors: Examining the Effectiveness of 
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts for the Massachusetts Settlor, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 170 (2013-
2014); Charles D. Fox IV & Michael J. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty Trusts, 37 REAL PROP.,  
PROB. AND TR. J. 287 (2002); Ronald Mann, A Fresh Look at State Asset Protection Trust Statutes, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1741 (2014); Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake 
and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (1994-1995); Jay Soled & Mitchell Gans, Asset Preservation 
and the Evolving Role of Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2015); Stewart 
Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000);  
R.W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The Estate Planning Tool of the Decade or a Charlatan, 13 
BYU J. PUB. L. 163 (1998-1999).  
18. See Carla Spivack, Beware the Asset Protection Trust, 5 EUR. PROP. L.J. 105 (2016). 
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regulatory framework of marital trusts, how conventional forms operate to shelter 
marital assets, and how marriage law currently strives to balance family wealth 
preservation and marital partnership. Subsequently, I engage in an in-depth inquiry 
into the new marriage trusts—how they came to be, how they work, and how they 
are marketed—and analyze why they should provoke concern. I look in particular 
at the Qualified Terminable Interest Property trust (QTIP) and the domestic asset 
protection trust (DAPT). Following this discussion of the new marriage trusts, Part 
Three proposes several ways to prevent the new trusts from disrupting the delicate 
ecology of the marital economy, based on an understanding of what constitutes an 
appropriate scope of power for first-parties to a marriage. Ultimately, this Article 
suggests ways to balance the competing principles of family wealth preservation and 
marital partnership in this brave new world of trust creation and proposes strategies 
for creating a regulatory system that maintains the integrity of each value-sphere 
while promoting fairness to all parties.  
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF MONEY AND MARRIAGE  
The desire of families and fiancés to protect their assets from spouses and 
soon-to-be spouses is not new; it constitutes part of a venerable tradition of family 
wealth preservation. This Part provides a short historical overview of the norms of 
family wealth management and the marital economy. I begin by describing 
longstanding inheritance practices of keeping wealth within the family—that is, the 
individual spouse’s family of origin—and how, only recently and due to major socio-
cultural shifts, new inheritance presumptions and norms have emerged favoring 
spousal inheritance. Now, sharing norms are shaping marriage law. Nevertheless, 
families are still using trust law to circumvent spouses in wealth transfer, and 
traditional notions of family wealth preservation still drive a large part of estate 
planning. Consequently, a conflict has arisen between current economic partnership 
norms and the historical norm of family wealth preservation. I end this Part, then, 
by analyzing the problem of conflicting norms and values and presenting a 
theoretical frame for understanding conflict as well as reconciliation between these 
competing value-spheres.  
A. The Long Rule of Family Wealth Preservation 
Marriage, historically, has not been a story of economic partnership. Rather, 
marriage has been defined by economic dependence for the wife and a duty of 
support for the husband. Spouses were not entitled to claim a great share of marital 
wealth either during marriage or in widowhood, nor were they central to family 
wealth transfer. Wealth transfer, instead, focused on family wealth preservation and 
used planning documents, from trust-based marriage settlements to wills, to tie 
wealth to family bloodlines.  
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1. The Interrelation of Spousal Need and Family Wealth 
Under coverture, a wife possessed a severely limited set of legal rights, and her 
property rights, in particular, were highly constrained.19 Once a woman was married, 
any property that the woman brought to the marriage came under the control of 
her husband.20 All money, clothing, jewelry, furniture, and other personal goods 
became the property of the husband, as did any leasehold land. A wife’s dowry, or 
portion, also came under the control of her husband. A married woman retained 
title to her freehold, and in theory, the husband could not dispose of it without her 
consent. However, a wife had no right to any income the property produced.  
In exchange for giving the bulk of her property interests over to her husband, 
the husband was bound by a duty of support. Sir William Blackstone described the 
duty as follows: 
The husband is bound to provide his wife with the necessaries by law as 
much as himself . . . . This duty to support her at his own home is by the 
Common Law independent of any statute. If she leaves him of her own 
accord the duty ceases. If he drive her away or fail to support her there, he 
is liable to those who furnish her with necessaries, either individuals or 
town authorities.21 
Legal commentators and treatise writers were not always in agreement as to 
what level of support the husband owed his wife; nevertheless, providing at least a 
basic level of support was a clear marital duty.22  
The duty of support, apart from marking the marital bargain, also signaled the 
importance of another key value: family wealth preservation. A husband’s duty was 
to enrich his family of origin, not his marital family, unless there was a son to carry 
on the bloodline. Therefore, during marriage, a husband was not encouraged or 
expected to give anything beyond maintenance to his wife. His wife was meant, in 
her look and dress, to reflect his station in life and, therefore, to serve as a positive 
attribute and ornament.23 However, the bulk of the husband’s estate was not to be 
consumed but rather preserved for inheritance purposes—to keep the family estate, 
name, and legacy intact.24  
 
19. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 550–57, 551 (4th  
ed. 2005) (“Like most legal fictions it was not universally applicable.”). For an overview of the 
complexity of coverture, see MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW: COVERTURE IN ENGLAND AND THE 
COMMON LAW WORLD (Tim Stretton & Krista Kesselring eds., 2013).  
20. ERICKSON, supra note 3, at 24–25. 
21. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. If a husband did not 
provide for his wife, she had the right to charge in his name at stores run by sympathetic vendors and 
the vendors had the right, subsequently, to recover their costs from the husband. 
22. See generally Joan M. Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to 
an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Twila Perry, The Essentials 
of Marriage: Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2003).  
23. STAVES, supra note 3, at 145–55. 
24. Gary, supra note 14, at 571. 
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Accordingly, just as a husband’s duty of support was circumscribed during 
marriage, it was likewise limited at death. As one scholar has reminded us: “Prior to 
this century, inheritance between spouses in Western Europe and the United States 
was rare.”25 This was because “[m]arriage was not seen as a reason for shifting family 
wealth, especially land, from one bloodline to another.”26 Marriage was meant to 
create alliances and heirs. Accordingly, the widow rarely ever had anything more 
than a life estate in the husband’s property. Ideally, there was a firstborn son who 
would inherit the majority of the estate and take his place in the family line, 
continuing the name and legacy of the husband’s family. After the widow’s death, 
the husband’s property reverted back to his birth family if it did not go to the 
couple’s children.27 As Susan Staves has commented: “[L]egal rules were motivated 
more by desires to facilitate the transmission of significant property from male to 
male and to ensure a basic level of protection for women and young children than 
they were . . . in increasing the autonomy of married women.”28  
2. A Widow’s Share: Duty After Death  
The conventional, default method for provisioning the widow was dower. 
Dower, also called “the widow’s share,” was “a moral obligation developed to 
secure maintenance for a wife upon her husband’s death.”29 Dower was a property 
right that the bride acquired upon marriage in exchange for her other lost property 
rights and generally consisted of a life estate in one-third of the husband’s freehold 
estate.30 Dower rights extended back at least to the Magna Carta, which stated that 
“the wife and children were entitled to their ‘reasonable parts,’”31 conventionally 
interpreted to mean one-third of the husband’s real and personal property.32  
The dower right vested on the husband’s death33 and was intended to sustain 
a widow through her old age.34 Because dower was intended solely as a mean of 
support in old age, the widow was entitled to nothing more than the lifetime use 
and enjoyment of whatever assets were designated for her support. She did not 
 
25. Id. 
26. Id. (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 239 
(1989)). 
27. Gary, supra note 14, at 571. 
28. STAVES, supra note 3, at 221–22. 
29. Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: The Kingdom of the Fathers, 10 LAW & INEQ. 137, 
146 (1991) (explaining that men had a right to curtesy and a life estate in all the lands even if there 
wasn’t a child).  
30. Often, a bride’s dowry was calculated in relation to the amount of her dower.  
31. Carole Shammas, English Inheritance Law and Its Transfer to the Colonies, 31 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 145, 146 (1987).  
32. Fellows, supra note 29, at 146. 
33. SPRING, supra note 3, at 40; see OWEN DAVIES TUDOR, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES 
ON REAL PROPERTY, CONVEYANCING, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS AND DEEDS 42 
(Butterworths 1856).  
34. STAVES, supra note 3, at 45. Commentators also described the widow as possessing a “moral 
right” to dower. Id.  
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possess the right to sell, gift, or devise any of the property. Widowhood meant 
receiving a maintenance allowance “without any right to the ownership of capital.”35 
Moreover, this lifetime right was subject to various factors and depended on “local 
custom, and if her husband was a copyholder, the approval of the lord. Her right to 
realty, usually a third of it, extended for life on some manors and only during 
widowhood or ‘as long as she remained chaste’ on others.”36  
Even with all of its limitations on a widow’s financial interests, dower was still 
frequently contested because of competing claims to the land in question and 
complications if the widow remarried. For these reasons, among others, dower was 
often unpopular and critics abounded. Janet Loengard observed that “dower 
invoked conflicting sentiments” because, on the one hand, “[i]t was proper that a 
woman should have enough to live on and bring up her children after her husband 
died.”37 On the other, dower “ran counter to the strong desire, countenanced by 
the family structure of feudal England, to keep landholdings undivided and in the 
hands of the heir.”38 Provisioning of widows through dower was therefore not only 
restricted to a maintenance obligation but also subject to manipulation and 
contestation by husbands and heirs.  
These contestations clarified that the rights of widows to family property were 
tolerated, at best, and that widows were often perceived as dependents “whose 
needs take assets away from the heroic job of accumulation.”39 
B. The Shift to Economic Partnership 
The norms of dower, support, and family wealth preservation had prodigious 
traction and were the prevailing template for marital wealth transfer until well into 
the twentieth century. Spurred in particular by seismic changes in social and cultural 
norms in the 1960s and 1970s, the predominance of the duty of support and other 
coverture values finally began to fade. In their place, notions of economic 
partnership, household contributions, and asset sharing within marriage became 
increasingly important values in marriage law.40 This Section details the shift. 
1. Equitable Distribution as Economic Partnership 
The explicit legal concept of economic partnership in marriage first emerged 
in the latter half of the twentieth century, primarily in conjunction with the decline 
of fault divorce and the ascendancy of equitable distribution. The idea of equitable 
distribution arose in policy papers and reports as early as 1963. In that year’s Report 
 
35. Fellows, supra note 29, at 150. 
36. Shammas, supra note 31, at 147. 
37. Janet S. Loengard, Of the Gift of Her Husband: English Dower and Its Consequences, in the 
Year 1200, in WOMEN OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 254 ( Julius Kirshner & Suzanne F. Wemple eds., 
Oxford 1985).  
38. Id.  
39. STAVES, supra note 3, at 203. 
40. Gary, supra note 14, at 573 
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of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the President’s Commission on the 
Status of Women, the authors observed: 
Marriage as a partnership in which each spouse makes a different but 
equally important contribution is increasingly recognized . . . . During 
marriage, each spouse should have a legally defined substantial right in the 
earnings of the other, in the real and personal property acquired through 
those earnings, and in their management.41  
Seven years later, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act introduced the idea 
of equitable distribution. Aligned with the idea that fault was not to be a factor in 
either granting the divorce or awarding property, the prefatory note to the Act stated 
that property distribution at divorce was to be treated, as nearly as possible, “like 
the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership.”42 Equitable 
distribution was designed specifically to address the problems inherent in the 
position of a homemaker upon divorce and to reward homemakers for their 
nonmonetary contributions to the marriage.43  
California was the first state to enact no-fault divorce in 1970, spurring other 
states to do the same.44 Change was not, however, particularly fast. It took decades 
for the majority of states to enact equitable distribution statutes. New York passed 
an equitable distribution law in 1980.45 By 1983, twenty-two states had adopted 
similar statutes,46 and by 2016, all states had adopted either equitable distribution or 
community property principles, and state legislatures had eliminated all title-based 
systems, generally embracing the idea of economic partnership within marriage.47 
State courts, interpreting equitable distribution statutes in the course of 
divorce litigation, also moved towards institutionalizing the principle of marriage as 
an economic partnership. In Rothman v. Rothman (1974), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court observed: “Thus the division of property upon divorce is responsive to the 
concept that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways 
 
41. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 
47 (1963). 
42. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. § 307, 309 (1973). 
43. See Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution 
of Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279, 286 (1989).  
44. See Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE 
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 31 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (noting 
California was first state to abolish traditional fault-based grounds for divorce and to substitute factual 
finding of marriage breakdown in their place, and California no-fault divorce law became effective in 
1970 in context of community-property marital regime). 
45. Henry H. Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1981). 
46. Mary Zeigler, An Incomplete Revolution: Feminists and the Legacy of Marital-Property Reform, 
19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 261 (2013) (“Equitable property division, rare in 1970. Became the 
norm in all but ten states by the mid-1980s. Whereas no states had property-division rules recognizing 
the contributions of homemakers in 1968, 22 states had adopted such a policy by 1983.”). 
47. In this remainder of this paper, I address only separate property states. In community 
property states, the landscape is quite different because both spouses have an immediate claim to certain 
forms of property even during marriage. I put aside that analysis for a different venue.  
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it is akin to a partnership.”48 And as an increasing number of states began to adopt 
equitable distribution statutes and state courts began to evaluate cases under these 
statutes, marriage as economic partnership became a mantra.49 Just over ten years 
after Rothman, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: “[O]ur Equitable 
Distribution Act . . . . reflects the idea that marriage is a partnership enterprise to 
which both spouses make vital contributions and which entitles the homemaker 
spouse to a share of the property acquired during the relationship.”50 The idea of 
marriage as an economic partnership became, over the last decades of the twentieth 
century, the guiding value of divorce law.  
2. The Broader Embrace of the Marital Unit 
The major reforms in divorce law that resulted to the embrace of equitable 
distribution rules had a number of ripple effects. In particular, inheritance law began 
to transform in order to match the advances made in spousal rights at divorce. 
Beginning in 1969, UPC drafters began to address ways to bolster the elective share 
(the modern version of dower) and “the position of the surviving spouse . . . steadily 
improved everywhere at the expense of the decedent’s blood relatives.”51 In 1990, 
seeking to address the growing strength of the economic partnership theory—and 
to equalize results for spouses at both divorce and death, so as to not provide less 
advantage at death than at divorce—the drafters of the UPC revisions took explicit 
steps to move the UPC toward economic partnership.  
This move was, again, most visible in the changes made to the elective share.52 
The drafters stated:  
The main purpose of the [elective share] revisions is to bring elective-share 
law into line with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic 
partnership. The economic partnership theory of marriage is already 
implemented under the equitable distribution system applied in both the 
common-law and community-property states when a marriage ends in 
divorce.53  
Implementing economic partnership meant redesigning the augmented estate 
and providing the surviving spouse with one half rather than one third of the 
 
48. Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 484, 501 (N.J. 1974). 
49. See, e.g., Cassiday v. Cassiday, 716 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Haw. 1986) (“These decisions are 
consistent with the time-honored proposition that marriage is a partnership to which both partners 
bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts.”).  
50. White v. White, 324 S.E.2d 829, 831–32 (N.C. 1985). 
51. Glendon, supra note 22, at 238. 
52. EXEC. COMM. OF THE NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS 
TO UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 1 (2008) (the drafters explicitly stated that “[t]he main purpose of the 
revisions is to bring the elective share into line with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic 
partnership”).  
53. Id. (“The partnership theory of marriage, sometimes also called the marital-sharing theory, 
is stated in various ways. Sometimes it is thought of ‘as an expression of the presumed intent of 
husbands and wives to pool their fortunes on an equal basis, share and share alike . . . . Sometimes the 
theory is expressed in restitutionary terms.”).  
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decedent’s estate.54 Because of these changes, Mary Ann Glendon has stated: “In 
the United States, the surviving spouse has clearly become the favorite in 
inheritance.”55 
At the same time the drafters made changes to the elective share, they also 
made changes to the intestacy rules and increased the surviving spouse’s share of 
the decedent’s estate. Based on new understandings about the presumed intent of a 
decedent, the UPC drafters granted the surviving spouse the whole of the intestate 
estate, if neither spouse had children from a previous relationship. This change, like 
the changes to the elective share, was made to bring inheritance law “into line with 
developing public policy and family relationships.”56  
The norm of marital partnership also spilled over into other related domains. 
Tax law, as early as 1948, introduced the idea of marital partnership with the joint 
return. Building on this, in 1981, Congress implemented the norm of marriage as 
an economic partnership into the tax code by approving an unlimited marital 
deduction. One scholar has remarked:  
The unlimited marital deduction reflected a decision to treat a husband and 
wife as one unit for the purposes of transfer taxation, a decision which 
paralleled the choice of the married couple as the proper unit for income 
taxation and solidified the concept that a husband and wife’s property is 
really “theirs.”57  
In 2012, this concept of the marital unit was strengthened even further with 
the introduction of portability, allowing one spouse to transfer his or her estate tax 
exemption to the surviving spouse. The unlimited marital deduction and portability 
have solidified the “legal fiction” of the married couple as “an irreducible economic 
unit,” and this notion has “become a first principle of taxation that is now deeply 
embedded in tax law and policy.”58 
In the majority of legal domains dealing with married couples, law and policy 
makers have attempted to instantiate the principle of partnership such that 
economic partnership in marriage has become—over the latter half of the twentieth 
century—the cornerstone of marriage law architecture. This has held true even as 
marriage has evolved, blended families formed upon second marriage have become 
the norm, and same-sex marriage has thrown gender roles into question. 
 
54. While death and divorce are the two main mechanisms for termination a marriage, it is clear 
that they differ. UPC drafters, however, sought to incorporate partnership language not to mirror 
divorce but to make it such that the rewards and incentives for loyalty in marriage were not less than 
those offered by divorce law.  
55. Glendon, supra note 22, at 242. 
56. Unif. Probate Code Art. II, Part 1 Note (1990). 
57. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 
5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 308 (1995) (noting that at the same time, Congress enacted the QTIP). 
58. See Lily Khang, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor: The Taxation of Women in Same-Sex 
Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 330 (2016). 
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Partnership has replaced dependency as a marital ideal in both legal and  
social expectation.59  
C. A Tale of Two Value-Spheres 
The shift from family wealth preservation to economic partnership as the 
touchstone value in marriage and inheritance law has not been a minor sideways 
shift. This change represents a profound shift in perspective, in particular 
concerning the role of the surviving spouse in wealth transfer. Family wealth 
preservation—a mode that emphasizes providing marginal resources to the spouse 
and favoring heirs—and marital economic partnership represent two distinctly 
different ways of looking at family relations, wealth transfer, and the marital 
economy. Each mode conceives of resource management and distribution quite 
differently and within each mode a particular legal infrastructure supports the 
project. Trust law primarily supports family wealth preservation just as marriage law 
primarily supports economic partnership, and the two modes often encompass 
separate asset management strategies that are in tension with one another. 
This mapping of differing modes of inquiry and sets of values—along with 
their related forms of resource management and asset distribution—has a 
conceptual basis in both sociology and philosophy. Max Weber set forth the idea of 
“value-spheres” in the early 1910s in his work, Intermediate Reflections (Religious 
Rejections of the World and Their Directions), in which he identified various distinct 
social realms, each with its own modular set of values and norms. These spheres 
ranged from economic, political, aesthetic, erotic, and intellectual, and according to 
Weber, “the various value-spheres stand in irreconcilable conflict with each 
other.”60 Each sphere, Weber argued, had an inner logic that conflicted with the 
inner logic of the others. The religious sphere was, in his schema, inescapably in 
conflict with the economic sphere because each sphere valued goods and ideas 
 
59. Partnership may, of course, mean different things and the cultural meaning of marital 
partnership has certainly evolved over time. The meaning of partnership invoked at divorce is primarily 
economic in the sense that all contributions to the marriage should be valued. Partnership, in many 
modern marriages, has become a deeper value in the sense that both partners contribute equally to most 
undertakings. Naomi Cahn and June Carbone describe this mew model of partnership: “This model 
rests on a new social script: a script that replaces women’s dependence on their husbands with spousal 
interdependence . . . . It eliminates mutually exclusive roles assigned entirely by gender . . . most critically, 
it assumes joint responsibility – for both the family finances and any resulting children.” NAOMI CAHN 
& JUNE CARBONE, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 
93 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014). This social script contrasts with the “gender-full” marriages that 
concerned divorce courts in the 1970s and may be more representative of not only different but also 
same-sex marriages. Abbie E. Goldberg, “Doing” and “Undoing” Gender: The Meaning and Division of 
Housework in Same-Sex Couples, 5 J. FAM. THEORY & REV. 85, 88 (2013). Accordingly, the “social 
script” of partnership of marriage has not only persisted but become increasingly complex in meaning 
as it has become embedded in the social imagination. 
60. Max Weber, Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions, in FROM MAX  
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (Hans Heinrich Gerth & Charles Wright Mills ed. & trans., 1991); 
RICHARD SWEDBERG & OLA AGEVALL, THE MAX WEBER DICTIONARY: KEY WORDS AND 
CENTRAL CONCEPTS (2nd ed. 2016) (Stanford Univ. Press 2005). 
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differently. This proliferation of value-spheres led, in Weber’s estimation, to 
“polytheism” and value fragmentation, forcing individuals to choose among a 
plurality of narratives and modes.61 
This notion of plurality and spheres carried over into Michael Walzer’s 
concept of spheres of justice.62 In his seminal work, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of 
Pluralism and Equality, Walzer states that there are various spheres of value and 
meaning that operate in the world and that each sphere not only conceives of goods 
differently but also distributes those goods in a way unique to that sphere.63 Goods 
can exist in multiple spheres, but in each sphere the good takes on a particular 
meaning. Bread, for example, means something different in the spheres of the 
marketplace, the home, and a place of worship.64 Moreover, not only does meaning 
change between spheres, so does what constitutes appropriate behavior and 
resource distribution. Accordingly, “[m]oney is inappropriate in the sphere of 
ecclesiastical office . . . [a]nd piety should make for no advantage in the marketplace, 
as the marketplace has commonly been understood.”65 There is not, then, one single 
standard of appropriate distribution or regulation; rather, “there are  
standards . . . [in] every distributive sphere.”66 These different spheres exist 
synchronously, like the marketplace and the temple. They can also exist in the same 
domain but across historical moments since “[s]ocial meanings are historical in 
character; and so distributions, and just and unjust distributions, change over 
time.”67 
The fact that multiple spheres exist simultaneously is not necessarily 
problematic. In fact, Walzer argues that the existence of a number of spheres is 
beneficial, because it allows for plural values to co-exist and even flourish without 
the values of one sphere dominating the others. Multiple spheres are, for Walzer, 
key to the formation and maintenance of a healthy, pluralistic society. Problems do 
occur, however, when one sphere attempts to assert the rules of that sphere, and 
thereby its dominance, in a separate and distinct realm.68 As an example, Walzer 
invokes a surgeon who “claims more than his equal share of wealth”69 based not on 
his skill as a surgeon but his social class or his educational background. When the 
rules meant to govern one distribution scheme begin to govern other schemes, the 
result is a form of tyranny. As Blaise Pascal stated: “The nature of tyranny is to 
 
61. Id. 
62. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND  
EQUALITY 8.  
63. Id.  
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 10. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 9. 
68. This description of the problem relies on Blaise Pascal, who in his Pensées wrote that “[t]he 
nature of tyranny is to desire power over the whole world and outside its own sphere.” Id. at 19. 
69. Id. at 17. 
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desire power over the whole world and outside its own sphere.”70 When this 
happens, plurality and complex equality fail.  
This theory of value-spheres lays the groundwork for a rich understanding of 
the distinctive modalities of family wealth management and marital partnership, 
where they co-exist and where they compete. To begin, the two value-spheres of 
family wealth preservation and marital partnership co-exist as two particular 
historical idioms within marriage law. That is to say, family wealth preservation and 
economic partnership represent two stages of historical evolution in the social 
meaning and legal management of marriage. And, because the transition from older 
to newer is incomplete, elements of family wealth preservation still inhere in 
marriage law. The two sets of values are in tension based on change over time. 
Marriage law has, however, found a way to maintain some internal boundaries 
between these two value sets, thereby allowing them to co-exist in relative accord 
and allowing for the due consideration of both families and spouses.  
Marriage law does this by allowing family wealth preservation, but based 
primarily on notions concerning the donor’s right to gift property and freedom of 
disposition. For example, the most well-known exception to marital property is that 
gifts and bequests to one spouse from a third party, such as a parent, are considered 
the separate property of the recipient even within marriage.71 Third parties—
parents, grandparents, any relative with financial means and generous impulses—
can give gifts, including the beneficial ownership of a trust interest without that gift 
becoming marital property. Accordingly, most trust interests are generally not 
marital property nor are they included in calculations for spousal support unless the 
recipient has a present and enforceable interest—and sometimes not even then.72 
The limiting principle is that the gifted assets come from and are gifted by a third 
party, thereby exempting them as marital property because the assets are not a 
product of a collective spousal effort or the “active labor, skill, or industry of either 
spouse.”73 Within the sphere of marriage, then, historical marriage law, essentially 
family wealth preservation, coexists—sometimes a little precariously—with modern 
marriage law, which focuses on partnership.  
In addition to this internal tension, the value-spheres of family wealth 
preservation and marital partnership are also in external tension in the 
contemporary legal setting as they operate within the fields of trust and marriage 
law. While family wealth preservation, as a historical value, continues to inform and 
shape marriage law to some degree, family wealth preservation continues to be the 
guiding—some might say core—value in trust law. Family money, therefore, means 
 
70. Id. at 15.  
71. In addition, soon-to-be spouses can contract around almost all marital property rules if they 
so choose in ante-nuptial agreements, that courts tend to uphold unless formed under circumstances 
of extreme duress or coercion. For discussion of these rules, see Shari Motro, Labor, Luck, and  
Love: Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate Property, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1623 (2008). 
72. For further discussion of these rules, see infra Section II.A.2. 
73. See Motro, supra note 71, at 1637. 
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something entirely different in the domain of trust law than it does in the domain 
of marriage law. The advent of the new marriage trusts has highlighted this conflict 
between the value-spheres of trust and marriage law, just as it has underscored the 
ways in which conflict between value-spheres can be disruptive and harmful.  
The new trust rules, in particular, unsettle the precarious equilibrium between 
family wealth preservation and marital partnership by transgressing the of  
third-party involvement. Whereas the current stasis between the value-spheres is 
based on assets being exempt only when a third party gifts those assets, the new 
trusts allow one spouse to create a trust and shelter assets from the other. No longer 
is the donor a parent, relative, or even generous friend. This time, the donor is a 
direct member of the marital partnership. And this partner is authorized to create a 
trust and fund it with potential marital assets without having a conversation with, 
or even necessarily notifying, the other marital partner. The new marriage trusts, 
consequently, represent an aggression upon marital partnership and constitute an 
overreaching attempt by family wealth values to exert authority over resource 
distribution within marriage.  
II. MODERN MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 
Marriage, and the creation of a new household, has historically been an 
important moment for financial negotiation and asset structuring because marital 
property rights intersect with the finances of both spouses and their families of 
origin. Trusts have traditionally played a key role in this planning, prized for their 
ability to protect assets from creditors, including spouses. In this Part, I describe 
how trust forms, both old and new, are put to use in marriage and family wealth 
planning as spouses seek to limit their personal financial liability—as well as the 
financial liability of their families of origin—within marriage. First, I explore 
something old: how the traditional forms of trust have successfully kept assets out 
of the control of spouses, both at death and divorce, based on notions of donor 
freedom. I subsequently describe the solutions, based on notions of control and 
ownership equivalence, which uniform law offers to this problem of asset sheltering 
in marriage. Lastly, I analyze something new: how the new marriage trusts provide 
heightened levels of asset protection by giving spouses themselves the power to 
form asset protection trusts. In this realm, there are few suggestions or models for 
legal solutions to the problem of fraud on marital property, as there are with 
conventional trusts. 
A. Something Old: The Enduring Utility of Trusts 
Trusts have long been a mechanism for sheltering assets from a beneficiary’s 
creditors, including spouses. The hallmark of these asset protection trusts has always 
been that third parties created them or, if created by the spouse, that they were 
irrevocable and the settlor-spouse had given up all control over the assets. Both 
historically and currently, less control generally equals more asset protection. 
Current marriage law has attempted to maintain and enforce these boundaries in 
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order to permit certain forms of family wealth preservation while creating equity 
within marriage. Given the patchwork of state laws, however, certain imbalances 
persist, and some state laws clearly favor family wealth preservation. Nevertheless, 
as this Section demonstrates, marriage law, as well as uniform probate and trust law, 
offers solutions to equalize the power of the two competing value-spheres. 
1. Death: Trusts and the Widow 
The property rights of surviving spouses have always been some of the most 
important and deeply entrenched marital inheritance rights. The elective share, 
based on old dower rules, is the default method of provisioning a widow and is a 
widow’s insurance against disinheritance. If the decedent spouse makes no 
provisions for his surviving spouse—or if he even disinherits her—she can still elect 
against his estate after his death, taking anywhere from one third to one half of the 
estate. Trusts, however, have always complicated the story and helped the decedent 
spouse keep money out of the hands of the surviving spouse at death. Trusts, used 
in this way, facilitate spousal disinheritance and exemplify an ethos of family wealth 
preservation. 
a. “No Dower of a Trust” and the Life Estate 
Two features primarily defined the dower right in its basic historical form: the 
use of the probate estate, excluding trusts, as the measure of the estate and the 
limitation to a lifetime interest. Trusts—both historically and still currently, in some 
states—allow one spouse to undermine the elective share rights of the other spouse 
and also restrict the surviving spouse’s property rights to a life estate.  
Under conventional rules, there was “no dower of a trust”74 because trusts 
took the assets out of the husband’s probate estate. Consequently, a husband could 
place his lands in trust and thereafter the land was no longer subject to dower 
claims.75 Trusts were thought to be particularly useful in this respect because a 
widow’s dower was considered to be a “great clog to alienations.”76 Furthermore, 
some commentators believed that dower was also inconvenient because it was “too 
generous to women.”77 Detractors reasoned that “it was inappropriate for a ‘young 
woman of little or no fortune’ to get one-third of the estate of a wealthy groom.”78 
The enactment of the Statute of Uses in 1536 was intended to end the practice of 
 
74. STAVES, supra note 3, at Chapter 2. 
75. In the preamble to the Statute of Uses, concern for defrauded widows barred from dower 
by the rule concerning uses is mentioned as one reason for enacting the statute. 
76. SPRING, supra note 3, at 48 (citing 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 137); see also STAVES, supra note 3, at 32. Landowners argued “dower made land titles 
uncertain because a purchaser was exposed to the risk that a widow of some remote prior owner would 
demand her dower from the subsequent purchaser upon that remote owner’s death.” Fellows, supra 
note 29, at 147. 
77. Fellows, supra note 29, at 147. 
78. Id. 
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using trusts to strip a widow of her dower rights.79 Nevertheless, landowners 
continued to find ways to use trusts to keep assets safe from creditor spouses.80  
It was not until 1969 that the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) replaced dower 
and curtesy (the surviving husband’s entitlement) with the gender-neutral statutory 
elective share for the surviving spouse.81 The elective share in most states provided 
almost exactly what dower had—the right to one-third of the decedent spouse’s 
probate estate. And the surviving spouse’s elective share could still be substantially 
defeated by the use of a trust. The 1969 version of the UPC attempted to deal with 
this problem, which the drafters called spousal disinheritance or “fraud on the 
spousal share,” by adopting the concept of the augmented estate,82 or a probate 
estate that is “augmented” with certain non-probate assets over which the decedent 
spouse had control. With each revision the UPC has taken additional steps to 
safeguard the elective share from fraud by refining how the augmented estate works 
and what assets it captures. Nevertheless, in many states, trusts can still successfully 
transfer assets out of the probate estate and, consequently, out of reach of the 
surviving spouse. 
Trusts have also been used to ensure that the surviving spouses did not have 
more than a life estate in the decedent spouse’s estate. With dower, trusts were 
unnecessary, as dower was never anything more than a life estate. Widows were to 
receive small maintenance sums that reflected both the husband’s desire to preserve 
money for the heir as well as the general belief that women lacked the “rationality 
required for the active management of property.”83 When property came to the 
widow outside of dower, trusts were frequently used to make sure that she had no 
more than a life estate and that the remainder went to the heir or back to the family 
of origin.  
Ultimately, dower and the elective share are security for the surviving spouse 
against disinheritance and impoverishment; public policy measures put in place to 
keep widows minimally resourced through private channels. Nevertheless, in the 
name of family wealth preservation, the trust has a long history of undermining 
these protections in order to preserve an even greater share of assets for family and 
heirs. 
b. The Elective Share: Still Cheating the Probate Estate 
Despite consistent improvements made by the UPC to stem spousal 
disinheritance and counterbalance family wealth preservation, state law still varies 
greatly on whether assets held in trust are includable in calculating the surviving 
 
79. SPRING, supra note 3, at 47.  
80. See SPRING, supra note 3, at 48; STAVES, supra note 3, at 37–49.  
81. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-113. Some states still have dower rights, but they are statutory. 
See Gary, supra note 14, at 575. 
82. The duty of support continues in modern marriage law; it is now gender-neutral. See June 
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 925 (2015). 
83. STAVES, supra note 3, at 226. 
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spouse’s elective share. When assets in trust are not included, the decedent spouse 
can transfer substantial assets in trust before death to someone other than the 
surviving spouse and prevent the surviving spouse from reaching these assets. In 
other words, the “no dower of a trust” rule has not gone away.  
A substantial minority of states still limit the elective share to one third of the 
probate estate, without adding in—or “augmenting”—the probate estate with any 
nonprobate transfers. Surviving spouses in these states have an uphill battle 
contesting the exclusion of nonprobate transfers and, ultimately, decedents have the 
ability to not only funnel assets to their heirs and other family members but also to 
effectively disinherit spouses.  
In a 2011 case from Wyoming, for example, the state supreme court concluded 
that a surviving spouse was not allowed to reach assets transferred via revocable 
inter vivos trust for purposes of calculating the elective share. “Simply put,” the 
court remarked, “the Wyoming Probate Code does not incorporate the augmented 
estate concept.”84 The Supreme Court of Alabama likewise, in Russell v. Russell, 
concluded that a surviving wife had no right to include assets transferred by her 
husband through an inter vivos revocable trust in the determination of her elective 
share. The court stated that, “in enacting its Probate Code in 1982, Alabama rejected 
the UPC’s augmented-estate concept . . . . Thus, we have no statutory authority for 
the proposition that a surviving spouse is entitled to a share of assets that were 
validly transferred by the decedent during his lifetime.”85 The husband was able to 
transfer the bulk of his estate, consisting primarily of shares in the family business, 
to a trustee, leaving only the very minimal residue of his estate to his wife.86  
In these states, the decedent spouse can shield assets from the reach of a 
surviving spouse using even revocable trusts, one of the most basic estate planning 
tools. These states prioritize preserving the estate plan of the decedent and, by 
implication, family wealth preservation at the expense of martial partnership. 
c. Designing a Better Augmented Estate 
Other states, to the benefit of surviving spouses, have decided to include 
certain non-probate assets in calculating the elective share, thereby creating an 
“augmented” estate. One approach has been to list the includable assets in the 
statute. In states that take an enumerated approach, like Iowa, problems arise when 
the asset is not listed.87 An alternate approach, taken by the UPC, is to leave the 
 
84. In re Estate of George, 2011 WY 157, ¶ 44, 265 P.3d 222, 230 (Wyo. 2011) (The husband 
had, through the trust, provided for the family business to pay a small annual salary to his widow and 
to maintain her health insurance. The wife received some voting stock in the company—the trustee, 
however, was the one authorized to vote her stock.). 
85. Russell v. Russell, 758 So. 2d 533, 538 (Ala. 1999), overruled by Oliver v. Shealey, 67 So. 3d 
73 (Ala. 2011). 
86. Id. at 534. 
87. In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Iowa 2012) (concerning whether a payable-on-
death account was includable). 
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particular assets unspecified and determine in each instance whether the decedent 
retained “dominion and control” over the assets.88  
The UPC model for the elective share—designed to reflect marital 
partnership—offers a clear way forward in the ongoing effort to temper the force 
of family wealth preservation in marriage. In states that follow the UPC approach, 
trusts over which the decedent had control cannot defeat the elective share.89 Family 
wealth preservation is still possible, especially using irrevocable trusts to transfer 
assets to heirs. Nevertheless, UPC rules limit the opportunity for aggressive family 
wealth preservation and provide a model for those states looking to balances the 
equities of family wealth preservation and marital partnership based on the concept 
of control.  
2. Divorce: Hiding Money in Plain Sight 
Trust forms also serve to limit one spouse’s interest in the other’s wealth at 
divorce. The separate estate—the original self-settled asset protection trust—
facilitated asset protection for women and their families actually within marriage, 
before married women were able to own property. After the separate estate, 
discretionary and spendthrift trusts were used to the same effect for family wealth 
holders. In this Section, I begin with a discussion of how these basic asset protection 
trusts have been used as a standard tool for family wealth preservation. I conclude 
this Section with an analysis of a recent divorce case that provoked great debate in 
Massachusetts and that clearly demonstrates not only the value of discretionary 
trusts in shielding assets, but also the strong and continuing importance of third-
party donor rights. 
a. The Return of the Separate Estate 
The separate estate was a trust that existed as early as the sixteenth century in 
England and allowed married women to own and control property during 
marriage.90 Married women could own property in these trusts because the wives 
held equitable, and not legal title, to the assets held in trust. Because a married 
woman did not possess legal ownership of the assets, they were subsequently not 
available to creditors including husbands. The separate estate was a valuable tool 
for families and women who wanted to protect their assets from the financial 
 
88. The Uniform Probate Code elective share section therefore specifies that the augmented 
estate is composed of (1) the decedent’s net probate estate; (2) the decedent’s non-probate transfers to 
others; (3) the decedent’s non-probate transfers to the surviving spouse; and (4) the surviving spouse’s 
property and non-probate transfers to others. All of these assets are aggregated, and the surviving 
spouse’s share is then taken from the “marital property” portion of this augmented estate. GARY, supra 
note 14, at 585–86; Raymond O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share,  
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 633 (2010). 
89. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-210 to -214. 
90. Allison Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM. 165 (2014). 
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vagaries of a new husband and circumvent the property-based disabilities imposed 
on married women by coverture.91  
A bride’s family could establish a separate estate trust for her benefit before 
or during marriage. Before marriage, parents generally established a separate estate 
for the bride as part of the marriage planning. During marriage, wives frequently 
became the beneficiaries of separate estate trusts through bequests made by family 
members.92 In addition, women could establish these trusts for themselves as long 
as they did so before marriage. Accordingly, women often created separate estates 
for themselves in anticipation of second marriages, using their jointure or widow’s 
share from the first marriage.93 The separate estate was, in this way, the original self-
settled asset protection trust, as well as an early planning tool for blended families. 
With a separate estate, women could protect assets for the benefit of children from 
the first marriage in order to keep these offspring from being dependent on the 
largesse of a stepparent.  
The separate estate declined in use and utility as legislatures began enacting 
Married Women’s Property Acts in both England and America.94 Once married 
women could own property during marriage, the immediacy of need for financial 
protection within marriage dissipated. The desire of great families to secure their 
wealth and shelter assets from future spouses, however, did not.  
b. Mapping the Rise of the Spendthrift Trust 
Spendthrift trusts,95  which protect assets from creditor claims, date back in 
the United States to the end of the nineteenth century, when the U.S. Supreme 
Court put its imprimatur on the form in Nichols v. Eaton.96 The case turned on a 
widow’s will and her son’s bankruptcy. Mrs. Sarah Eaton established a testamentary 
trust for her children with the proceeds from her estate, specifying that if the 
bankruptcy of one of her sons would render the income “payable to some other 
person, then the trust . . . should immediately cease.”97 
 
91. For discussion and an overview of the separate estate, see id.  
92. Id. 
93. Amy Erickson remarks, “a second-time bride was older, perhaps wealthier, and wiser at least 
in the ways of legal coverture than she had been the first time around.” ERICKSON, supra note 3, at 123.  
94. RICHARD CHUSED, MARRIED WOMEN’S PROPERTY LAW: 1800-1850. 
95. A spendthrift trust, in its most basic form, is a trust containing a provision stating that the 
beneficiary cannot voluntarily alienate her interest in the trust. Because of this restriction, creditors 
cannot attach the beneficiary’s interest nor can they obtain a court order to attach a future distribution. 
This holds true even if the beneficiary is entitled to mandatory distributions and has funds available to 
satisfy creditors. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES  
695–96 (Aspen Publishers, 9th ed. 2013). This is as opposed to pure discretionary trusts. With those 
trusts, a creditor can obtain a court order to attached future distributions. Spendthrift trusts are against 
public policy in England. 
96. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 717–22, 723 (1875); see Adam Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and 
Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 6 (1995). The spendthrift trust 
had a longer history in England. The spendthrift trust was, at the time of Nichols, not tolerated under 
English law.  
97. Nichols, 91 U.S. 716 at 723. 
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Not long after the mother died, one son declared bankruptcy and “made a 
general assignment of all his property to Charles A. Nichols for the benefit of his 
creditors.”98 Leaning on the doctrine of freedom of disposition, the Court sided 
with the mother over the creditors, stating:  
Why a parent . . . [who] wishes to use his own property in securing the 
object of his affection . . . from the ills of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, 
and even his own improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should 
not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.99  
The decision was immediately criticized. John Chipman Grey, a vociferous 
critic, boldly stated: “[S]pendthrift trusts have no place in the system of the 
Common Law.”100 Nevertheless, the spendthrift trust was further grafted into 
American law seven years later with Broadway National Bank v. Adams,101 in which 
the Massachusetts state supreme court affirmed the right of a donor to dispose of 
his property as he saw fit over the rights of creditors.102  
Subsequently, the spendthrift trust became a useful tool that helped families 
shelter assets from creditors, including spouses.103 Only fourteen years after 
Broadway Bank, a Texas appellate court upheld the use of a spendthrift trust to keep 
assets held in trust for the benefit of the husband from being counted as community 
property.104 In McClelland v. McClelland, Dora McClelland sued her ex-husband 
seeking rental income from property that had been left to her ex-husband by his 
father. The court concluded that if “the income arising from the estate was not 
available” to the husband, then it was not available to wife as community property 
upon divorce. To allow the wife an interest in the trust income, the court reasoned, 
would be to diminish and harm “the right of the testator.”105  
Now, spendthrift provisions are standard boilerplate language in trust forms, 
and drafters routinely include them in all kinds of trusts.106 Ordinary creditors can 
 
98. Id. at 727. 
99. Id. (holding that the mother had a legal right to establish for the benefit of her son a 
testamentary trust that terminated the son’s right to assets if and when he became insolvent). The 
holding did not, therefore, establish the validity of spendthrift trusts. The dicta did. Anne S. Emanuel, 
Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179, 188 (1993).  
100. See GARY, supra note 14, passim, summarized at 213.  
101. Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 170 (1882).  
102. Id. at 173 (“The founder of this trust was the absolute owner of his property. He had the 
entire right to dispose of it, either by an absolute gift to his brother, or by a gift with such restrictions 
or limitations, not repugnant to law, as he saw fit to impose.”). 
103. Bradley v. Palmer, 61 N.E. 856, 881–82 (1901) (explaining that the mother created a 
spendthrift trust for her son, who was an extravagant spender and an alcoholic, and stated specifically 
that “in no case shall any of such income be applied to the support or maintenance of my said son’s 
wife; and the same shall never be amenable to any order or judgment of a court which his said wife 
might obtain for alimony, support, or for any other cause.”). 
104. McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350, 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), writ refused. 
105. Id.  
106. Spendthrift trusts have become so ubiquitous that in Delaware, for example, all trusts are 
presumptively spendthrift, and in New York all trusts are presumptively spendthrift with respect to 
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only recover what they are owed once a distribution has been made. The Uniform 
Trust Code (UTC) has, however, attempted to balance the equities at divorce by 
deeming ex-spouses with divorce decrees to be “exception creditors,” who may 
obtain an order attaching either present or future distributions from the trust, 
although they may not compel a distribution.107 
Spendthrift trusts created by third parties can keep family wealth out of the 
hands of a spouse with the insertion of just one small provision barring the 
beneficiary’s alienation of his trust interest. In a UTC state,108 however, an  
ex-spouse may have some recourse, if she has a support order. The UTC, 
accordingly, has strengthened marital partnership, giving it increased substance 
when weighed against family wealth preservation. 
c. “Mere Expectancies”: Hiding Assets in Plain Sight 
To compound protection against creditors, settlors create trusts that contain 
not only spendthrift provisions but also significant amounts of trustee discretion. 
Because income from these trusts is not guaranteed to the beneficiary and is 
distributable only at the trustee’s discretion, the money in trust is not available to 
creditors unless and until the beneficiary actually receives a distribution. The validity 
of these trusts, like the spendthrift trusts, was affirmed by American courts around 
the turn of the nineteenth century on the basis of donor freedom. In the famous 
Hamilton v. Drogo case, a New York court protected money put in trust for William 
Drogo, Duke of Manchester, by his mother from creditors, concluding: “In the 
present case no income may ever become due to the judgment debtor. We may not 
interfere with the discretion which the testatrix has vested in the trustee any more 
than her son may do so.”109 The creditors were out of luck until a distribution was 
made to Drogo.  
Discretionary trusts still play a large role in family wealth preservation and are 
especially useful at divorce.110 Modern courts generally consider beneficiaries of a 
discretionary spendthrift trust to possess nothing more than a speculative interest 
in the trust assets—a “mere expectancy”—because they do not have a guaranteed 
right to distributions from the trust. Five states—New Jersey, Missouri, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin—include trust interests in the marital estate at 
divorce only if the beneficiary has a present possessory interest or the right to 
 
income. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 95, at 696. Only three states bar the enforcement of 
these kinds of provisions. 
107. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503. Distributions subject to attachment include distributions 
required by the express terms of the trust, such as mandatory payments of income, and distributions 
the trustee has otherwise decided to make, such as through the exercise of discretion. 
108. There are currently thirty-three UTC states. 
109. Hamilton v. Drogo, 150 N.E. 496, 497 (1926). 
110. See Jonathan W. Wolfe, How a Trust May Impact Your Divorce Case, 38 FAM. ADVOC. 14, 
15 (Fall 2015) (noting that while some states have “a breadth of precedent” governing this issue, other 
states have few, if any, reported decisions). 
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withdraw trust assets.111 Massachusetts courts generally maintain that any interest in 
a discretionary trust is non-includable in the marital estate: “[A] party’s beneficial 
interest in a discretionary trust . . . because of the peculiar nature of such a  
trust . . . is too remote or speculative to be so included.”112 The Colorado Supreme 
Court, elaborating on this rule, concluded in In re Marriage of Jones that, “unlike a 
vested retirement plan, the beneficiary of a discretionary trust has no contractual or 
enforceable right to income or principal from the trust, and cannot force any action 
by the trustee unless the trustee performs dishonestly or does not act at all.”113  
Divorcing spouses looking to pierce a trust and make the income available for 
spousal or child support payments have somewhat better success in states that have 
enacted the UTC. Here again, ex-spouses with divorce judgments are exception 
creditors. With discretionary trusts, the UTC states that a court may order a 
distribution to satisfy a court order for either spousal or child support, but only to 
“[t]he extent a trustee has not complied with a standard of distribution or has abused 
a discretion.”114 The potential for a court order to reach into a discretionary trust is 
limited, however, as a court cannot direct a trustee to distribute more than the 
standard set by the trust terms would have necessitated. 
Discretionary and spendthrift trusts can, consequently, enable a high degree 
of family wealth preservation based on the rights of the third-party donor. UTC 
rules that make ex-spouses exception creditors recalibrate the balance of power, 
but—as the case study in the next section demonstrates—third-party assets and a 
lack of ownership equivalence remain deciding factors. 
d. “Family Wagons Circled the Family Money” 
The Massachusetts case of Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl was a recent and highly 
contested example of how discretionary trusts work. The couple married in 2000 
and during the marriage, the husband worked as an assistant bookstore manager at 
one of his father’s subsidiary corporations, earning approximately $170,000 
annually.115 In 2004, the husband also began receiving distributions from a trust that 
his father established for his benefit.116 In the same year, the wife, who had been in 
the Army Reserves, retired from that job at the behest of her husband, who wanted 
 
111. Id. New Jersey courts, for example, have continuously held that a beneficiary spouse’s trust 
interest does not constitute marital property unless the beneficiary has acquired “unimpaired control 
and totally free use and enjoyment” of the trust assets. See Mey v. Mey, 79 N.J. 121, 125 (1979); see also 
Paulson v. Paulson, 783 N.W.2d 262, 271 (N.D. 2010); Friebel v. Friebel, 510 N.W.2d 767, 769  
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993).  
112. See D.L. v. G.L, 811 N.E.2d 1013 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
113. In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152, 1156–57 (Colo. 1991) (concluding “[t]o the extent 
that it has already not done so, the trial court on remand should consider the wife’s interest in the trust 
as an economic circumstance” and a discretionary factor when allocating property and awarding 
support). 
114. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504. 
115. Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. 105, 106 (2016). 
116. Id. 
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her to stay at home with their special needs daughter. The wife began working as an 
ultrasound technician on a part-time basis and, at the time of the divorce, was 
earning approximately $22,672 annually.117  
At issue in the couple’s divorce proceedings was whether the present value of 
the husband’s interest in the trust—an irrevocable discretionary spendthrift trust—
could be considered part of the marital estate.118 The trust benefitted an open class, 
comprised of the father’s “living issue” and provided for distributions to 
beneficiaries at the discretion of the trustees, “to provide for the comfortable 
support, health, maintenance, welfare and education of each or all members of such 
class.”119 At the time of the divorce trial, there were eleven living issue who were 
beneficiaries and the trust had a value of approximately $25 million.120  
The trial court judge valued the husband’s interest in the trust to be  
one-eleventh of the trust value, or approximately $2 million. On appeal, the court 
affirmed this inclusion of the husband’s trust interest in the marital estate and its 
valuation.121 The court noted that the husband’s monthly distributions from the 
trust, which had arrived regularly since the trust’s creation, stopped “precisely on 
the eve of the husband’s divorce filing.”122 The other beneficiaries, in contrast, 
continued to receive their distributions. The court stated: “[T]he spendthrift 
provision is being invoked as a subterfuge to mask the husband’s income stream 
and thwart the division of the marital estate in the divorce.”123 The court also noted 
that one of the trustees was the husband’s brother, the other the family  
attorney: “To use understatement: the record shows the 2004 trust was not 
administrated impartially by the two trustees.”124 What had happened, the court 
concluded, was that “as the divorce began, ‘the proverbial family wagons circled the 
family money.’”125 
The Massachusetts supreme court, however, disagreed with the lower court 
rulings. Returning to the conventional analytic framework, the court concluded that 
the husband’s trust interest was “so speculative as to constitute nothing more than 
[an] expectanc[y],” and consequently it was not includable in the marital estate.126 
The court remarked:  
Interests in discretionary trusts generally are . . . too remote for inclusion 
in a marital estate, because the interest is not “present [and] enforceable”; 
 
117. Id. She earned another $7,428 in rental income. 
118.  Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 55 N.E.3d 933 (Mass. 2016). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 2. 
121. Id.  
122. Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 37 N.E.3d 15, 17 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015), review granted, 47 
N.E.3d 684 (Mass. 2015), and vacated and remanded, 55 N.E.3d 933, 934 (Mass. 2016). 
123. Id. 
        124.     Id. at 21. 
125. Id.  
126. Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 55 N.E.3d 933, 934 (Mass. 2016). (quoting  
Adams v. Adams, 945 N.E.2d 844, 859 (Mass. 2011). 
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the beneficiary must rely on the trustee’s exercise of discretion, does not 
have a present right to use the trust principal, and cannot compel 
distributions.127 
Commentators have vigorously debated the outcome of the Pfannenstiehl case. 
Trust lawyers have supported the outcome, pleased that the court did not undo the 
trust’s asset protection features.128 The husband’s lawyer stated his satisfaction with 
the ruling based on donor intent: “[The husband’s father] did not intend . . . for an 
ex-spouse to get part of his estate, and that’s what the court is upholding.”129 
Another commentator wrote: “This is a relief to those who draft trusts for the 
purpose of ‘asset protection.’”130 On the other hand, commentators have also 
noted: “The equities of this case appear to favor Diane.”131 In addition, questions 
about the independence of the trustee, the decanting of the trust, and the ability of 
the court to encompass separate property into the marital estate using 
Massachusetts’s hotchpot approach have continued to cast doubt on the result. 
Pfannenstiehl demonstrates that discretionary spendthrift trusts continue to be 
an effective mechanism for keeping assets out of the marital estate. The 
effectiveness of this trust form in protecting assets, however, is clearly based on the 
donor intent of the third party coupled with the beneficiary’s lack of ownership 
interest. This is marriage law’s current resting point in creating balance between 
marital partnership and family wealth preservation. 
B. Something New: Asset Protect, Version 2.0 
In the last several decades, prodigious changes to trust law in a number of 
states have created new opportunities for family wealth preservation and asset 
protection that go far beyond what already exists. In this Section, I analyze how 
these new trusts break the old rules, enabling spouses to assert unilateral control 
over possible marital assets, thereby disrupting the tenuous settlement between trust 
wealth preservation and economic partnership.  
 
 
127.  Id. at 940.  
128. See, e.g., Robert J. O’Regan, Pfannenstiehl: Out of a Mistake Comes Clarity, 
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (AUG. 9, 2016), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/
estate-planning/pfannenstiehl-out-mistake-comes-clarity [perma.cc/QDY8-D7L4]. 
129. Michael Levenson, SJC Rules Heir Can Refuse to Pay $1.4m to Ex-wife, BOSTON GLOBE 
(Aug. 05, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/08/05/high-court-rules-scion-wealthy-
family-doesn-have-pay-wife/cLDKzM7oTGbkvvVNM5O3dK/story.html [perma.cc/FJ7K-VDGF]. 
130. Matthew Solomon, Words Matter: Pfannenstiehl Overruled by Supreme Judicial Court, 
ISRAEL, VAN KOOY & DAYS, LLC, http://www.yourfamilymatterslawblog.com/words-matter-
pfannenstiehl-overruled-by-supreme-judicial-court/ [perma.cc/DYQ7-PH7P] ( last visited July 15, 
2017). 
131. Harry S. Margolis, Does Pfannenstiehl Case Undermine Asset Protection in Massachusetts?, 
MARGOLIS & BLOOM, LLP, (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.margolis.com/our-blog/does-recent-
divorce-undermine-centuries-of-spendthrift-trust-law [perma.cc/6HYP-LWRD].  
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1. QTIP Trusts: Bringing Back the Life Estate 
While trusts have long been used to limit a surviving spouse’s property claims, 
now there is a newer and increasingly popular mechanism for limiting a surviving 
spouse’s interest in the decedent’s estate: the Qualified Terminable Interest 
Property (QTIP) trust. QTIP trusts allow one spouse to unilaterally elect to put 
assets—even potential marital assets—into a trust that simultaneously restricts the 
surviving spouse to a life estate and qualifies for the unlimited marital deduction. 
In this Section, I discuss the origin of the QTIP trust, how these trusts work to strip 
a surviving spouse of both financial agency and marital property rights, and how 
QTIPs are marketed to a masculinist sense of wealth preservation.  
a. QTIPs and the Divorce Revolution 
In 1981, when the U.S. Congress enacted the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
(ERTA), the guiding theory for a number of changes was the “decision to use the 
marital unit as the proper unit of taxation.”132 One of the major features of the Act 
was the introduction of the unlimited marital deduction.133 No longer would there 
be a limit on how much spouses could transfer to one another free of any transfer 
tax at death. ERTA also authorized QTIPs as part of this “marital unit” scheme.134  
Previous to the authorization of QTIPs, to qualify for the marital deduction 
one spouse had to give the other spouse full control of the property. Life estates 
and other terminable interests did not qualify for the deduction. QTIPs offered an 
exception to this rule, allowing the decedent spouse to limit the surviving spouse’s 
interest in the property to a life estate while still qualifying the property for the 
marital deduction. Moreover, the rules of election adopted at the time allow one 
spouse to place assets in a QTIP unilaterally, without the consent or knowledge of 
the other spouse. Based on this combination of restricted ownership and unilateral 
decision-making, Wendy Gerzog has remarked that “it was a rather Herculean leap 
in logic that led Congress to state that the QTIP provisions reflect the shared 
decision-making of a husband and wife in a marriage.”135  
Looking past the “marital unit” language, Congress enacted QTIPs against a 
social backdrop of increasing divorce, remarriage, and general marital instability. 
Between 1970, when no-fault divorce first appeared on the legal landscape, and 
1981, when ERTA was enacted, divorce rates had skyrocketed and no-fault divorce 
was changing both cultural norms with respect to marriage as well as longstanding 
 
132. Gerzog, supra note 57, at 306. 
133. I.R.C. § 2056(a). 
134. The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(d)(1),  
95 Stat. 172, 302-03 (1981); I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(i), 2523(0(2); see also Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(b), 
25.2523(0-1(b). 
135. He wants his cake (i.e., the tax benefit of deferral), and he wants to eat it, too (i.e., to 
control who will finally receive the underlying property).” Gerzog, supra note 57, at 319; see also 
O’BRIEN, supra note 81, at 630. 
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patterns of wealth transfer.136 Second and third marriages were becoming common 
occurrences and the QTIP allowed spouses—usually husbands—to provide a life 
estate interest to a second or third spouse, eliminating concern about what that 
surviving spouse would do with the bulk of the money. The QTIP provided a 
mechanism for ensuring that stepparents would not disinherit children from first 
marriages and that the decedent spouse could provide for multiple sets of 
dependents without interference. As one senator explained during the 
Congressional debates: “The property owner would like to be sure that upon the 
death of his spouse his children by a prior marriage or marriages share in his 
property, including the marital deduction property.”137 
The QTIP was the necessary result of the divorce revolution—a tool for 
managing multiple marriages and the complications of estate planning that ensued 
from these blended families. In addition, the QTIP has become a useful tool for 
family wealth preservation by allowing asset preservation and playing into outdated 
stereotypes about women, widows, and wealth.  
b. Disinheriting Spouses Unilaterally 
One of the greatest problems with QTIP trusts, from a marital partnership 
perspective, is the fact that they allow one spouse to unilaterally elect QTIP 
treatment of assets. If one spouse decides to set up the QTIP as an inter vivos 
transfer, he can make the gift to the trust unilaterally; alternately, he can empower 
his executor (assuming it is someone other than his surviving spouse) to make the 
election at his death. The surviving spouse may have no input whatsoever and 
certainly none is required.138  
Surviving spouses are left, in such cases, with little remedy other than to 
contest the QTIP election, an uphill battle, or take the elective share instead.139 The 
latter option can be as difficult as the former, as In re Estate of Karnen, a case from 
the Supreme Court of South Dakota in 2000, demonstrates. In that case, despite a 
longstanding marriage, because the wife unilaterally created a QTIP, the husband 
had only a life income in their marital estate and no assets to leave his heirs at his 
death.  
 
136. See Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1255–60 (2015). 
137. Gerzog, supra note 57, at 310. 
138. See Gerzog, supra note 57. One law firm suggests that the QTIP creator may want to 
“prepare” the spouse. “Your spouse, for example, should know that income will flow life-long, but 
access to the trust principal will be limited.” QTIP Trusts Still Offer Advantages, HOGAN TAYLOR, 
http://hogantaylor.com/qtip-trusts-still-offer-advantages/ [perma.cc/WX82-USHM] ( last visited 
July 16, 2017). Spouses may want to pick a good moment because “The surviving spouse typically 
resents the restrictions against unlimited access to principal.” QTIPs  Made  Easy , IVKD LAW, http:/
/ivkdlaw.com/the-firm/our-articles/divorce-and-estate-planning/qtips-made-easy/ [perma.cc/
N6WP-HF5X] ( last visited July 16, 2017). 
139. See Donna Litman, The Interrelationship Between the Elective Share and the Marital 
Deduction, 40 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 539–65 (Fall 2005). 
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The couple married in 1947 and had no children, living happily together for 
fifty years until the wife’s death in 1997.140 The bulk of their assets were titled in the 
wife’s name and, toward the end of her life when the wife executed a will, she 
bequeathed all these assets to her husband. She gave him the ranch she had owned 
at the time of marriage, which had been their marital home, as well as an estate 
valued at over $2 million.141 Not long after, the wife’s health began to fail and 
Norwest Bank was appointed conservator of her estate. For tax planning purposes, 
the Bank revised her estate plan and threw out the first will. Subsequently, the Bank 
created one trust in the amount of her estate tax exemption and placed the residue 
of the estate in a QTIP.142 The husband was named the sole income and principal 
beneficiary of both trusts. After his death, the remainder of both trusts was to go 
to the wife’s heirs.143 
Despite being able to access both income and principal in the trusts, the 
husband elected to take his statutory share after his wife’s death. The court observed 
that the husband wished “to attain a fee interest in a portion of the estate assets, 
rather than merely the life interest . . . [in order] to pass something on to his 
heirs.”144 The court was sympathetic to this desire, remarking: “[W]e understand 
how Andrew might feel that he is entitled to fee ownership in a share of the estate 
after fifty years of marriage.”145 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the husband 
was not entitled to take his elective share because it was “overfunded,” that is to say 
the amount made available to him via the will was more than he would receive under 
the elective share.146 Accordingly, the trial court denied the husband’s petition to 
take his elective share. Adding insult to injury, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
remarked that the husband’s claim failed because “[t]he goal of our elective share 
statutes is to protect a surviving spouse from disinheritance, rather than reward him 
or her for contributions made to the economic partnership of an enduring 
marriage.”147  
QTIP trusts make the old new again. They revitalize estate planning that limits 
the property rights of the surviving spouse in order to better provision other family 
members. Furthermore, because of unilateral decision-making and the possibility of 
fraud on marital property, QTIPs completely fail to account for marital partnership. 
As a result, QTIPs dislocate the balance between family wealth preservation and 
economic partnership. 
 





145. Id. at 36. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. This despite being adopters of the UPC. 
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c. Marketing the QTIP to Men 
As enacted, the QTIP provisions were “couched in politically correct, gender 
neutral terms” and statistics, as well as caselaw, show that women as well as men 
are consumers of the financial product.148 Nevertheless, women have for various 
reasons been QTIP consumers at a lower rate than men since the authorization of 
these trusts.149 Men’s wealth holdings are greater than women’s, making wealth 
transfer planning a larger concern. Moreover, in different-sex marriages, life 
expectancies suggest that men will be in the position of “first-to-die” and therefore 
are forced to think about how a surviving spouse will manage assets left. Even if 
the woman happens to be the wealth holder, however, Lily Khang observes that a 
woman may be “less likely than her male counterpart to marry a series of younger 
spouses and therefore . . . less likely to use a QTIP trust.”150 Khang also predicts 
that women in same-sex marriages would be less attracted by the QTIP and are 
“even less likely than heterosexual women to use QTIP trusts for a ‘Donald Trump 
arrangement.’”151 Consequently, and responsive to this data, QTIP marketing 
speaks directly to men and revives timeworn notions about women, their financial 
literacy and spending habits.  
Decidedly gendered, QTIP advertisements generally cast the husband as the 
decedent and the wife as the surviving spouse—the problematic actor to be reined 
in through QTIP rules.152 QTIP marketing materials stress three points in 
promoting the trust form. First, that the surviving spouse may be an evil stepmother, 
who will not provide for her stepchildren if given full control of her inheritance. 
Second, that the surviving spouse may be financially unsophisticated and not good 
with money; and third, that the money is your money, so you should be able to do 
what you want with it, preserving it for future generations. Like the QTIP itself, 
these gender stereotypes undermine the idea of spouses as equal partners in 
marriage and promote consideration of the widow as a drain on family wealth. 
Furthermore, QTIP marketing directly undermines the concept of marital property 
and shared wealth.  
True to the concerns that originally motivated the authorization of the QTIP, 
law firms and estate planners today continue to advertise the QTIP as a vehicle for 
protecting a spouse’s money in the age of blended families. Advertisements focus 
on the fear that a surviving spouse will disinherit her stepchildren, given the 
opportunity. One estate planner provides a vivid example of why someone, a 
 
148. Gerzog, supra note 57, at 305 
149. Khang, supra note 58, at 352 (“For 1995 decedents for whom estate tax returns were filed, 
20% of male decedents used QTIP trusts while 8% of female decedents used QTIP trusts. In the same 
year, male decedents used QTIP trusts for assets valued at $13.3 billion while female decedents used 
QTIPs for assets valued at $3.2 billion.” Other studies show that the gap might be decreasing and 
women might be catching up to men in their consumption of QTIPs.). 
150. Id. at 352–53. 
151. Id.  
152. See Allison Tait, Commentary on U.S. v. Windsor, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN 
TAX OPINIONS (Cambridge Press 2017); Khang, supra note 58, at 352;. 
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husband might want to create a QTIP: “[With a QTIP], Jennifer has no power to 
change the beneficiaries named in the QTIP. Mr. Q can rest peacefully, knowing 
that his children from his first marriage will receive the assets remaining in the trust 
after the death of Jennifer.”153 The Wilmington Trust estate planning advisors 
phrase it similarly, if more elegantly: “The restrictive ownership provisions of a 
QTIP trust are particularly useful for second marriages since you may want to 
ensure that the amounts held in the trust will ultimately pass to your children or 
family and not the children or family of your second spouse.”154 In this way, they 
point out, a QTIP trust will “provide for your spouse after your death while 
protecting your assets for future generations.”155 Another estate planner likewise 
states that a QTIP allows the decedent spouse to say to widow as well as children: 
“I took care of you both.”156 Taking a page from the dower handbook, these 
characterizations of the QTIP focus clearly on a wealth transfer strategy of 
supporting the widow with a life estate and enriching the heirs with the bulk of the 
inheritance.  
Another compelling reason to use a QTIP, according to advertisements, is to 
quell the fear that the surviving spouse will over-consume the assets or otherwise 
misuse them, due to her financial and investment incompetence.157 One law firm 
advertises: “Control of the assets by a trustee will reduce the chance of depletion 
through squandering or unwise investments by the surviving spouse.”158 Another 
law firm, vividly setting forth the case for creating a QTIP using the Simpsons, 
observes:  
The one potential fly in the ointment that could prevent Homer’s children 
from inheriting much, if any, assets in the Family Trust is that their 
inheritance is dependent on Marge not spending it all and/or not making 
bad investments that decrease the value of the assets held in the Family 
Trust.159  
There might also, estate lawyers suggest, be “bad actors” involved. In these 
cases, the QTIP’s financial paternalism is a welcome safeguard: “The surviving 
spouse might become vulnerable to bad financial advice or scammers, or be 
 
153. How a Q-TIP Trust Protects Your Surviving Spouse, and Other Members of Your Family, 
JOHN L. ROBERTS, http://estateplansplus.com/html/trusts_qtip.html [perma.cc/P7AH-R6NP] ( last 
visited July 16, 2017). 
 154. Wealth  Planning:  The  Benefits  of  QTIP  Trusts,  WILMINGTON  TR., http:// 
library.wilmingtontrust.com/wealth-planning/the-benefits-of-qtip-trusts [perma.cc/LU7G-2GQA] 
( last visited July 16, 2017). 
         155.   Id.  
156. Charles Delafuente, A Guiding Hand for Bequests, Beyond the Grave, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/qtip-trust-guides-bequests-beyond-the-
grave.html [perma.cc/RK3M-78UZ].  
157. Khang, supra note 58, at 353. 
158. HOGAN TAYLOR, supra note 120. 
159. What Is Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trust aka QTIP?, KEYT LAW, LLC, http:/
/www.keytlaw.com/arizonawills/2013/07/qtip/ [perma.cc/M2VK-CMZ3] ( last visited July 16, 
2017). 
First to Printer_Tait (Do Not Delete) 10/29/2019  1:36 PM 
2019] TRUSTING MARRIAGE 231 
subjected to influence by other family members who have their own interests in 
mind. The QTIP trust insulates the spouse and the inheritance from these bad 
actors.”160 Women, it is clear from this perspective, are not sufficiently proficient 
with money and asset management to be given full ownership of property and 
inheritance.  
Compounding the problematic nature of these descriptions, QTIP 
advertisements also indiscriminately characterize QTIP assets as belonging solely to 
the decedent spouse—your estate, your money —and fail to acknowledge the concept 
of shared assets, marital property, or economic partnership. Hence, one estate 
lawyer was quoted in a story about QTIPs in the New York Times as saying that 
QTIPs “could prevent a second wife from ‘running off with the assets’ of a deceased 
husband.”161 The estate planner admits that this is, for better or worse, “a 
stereotypical example.”162 However, estate planners routinely trade in these 
stereotypes, declaring that QTIPs have the power to limit the agency of a “spouse 
who may wish to leave your money to his or her children,”163 or a spouse who 
remarries, letting the “the new spouse take[ ] marital ownership of your estate.”164 
Without discussion of how the trust creator’s estate might actually be part of the 
larger marital estate, QTIP advertisements and literature embody dated notions of 
marital property ownership and play on the fears, as well as the entitlements, of 
high-wealth spouses. 
Ultimately, a typical advertisement blends all these concerns together and 
offers up the QTIP as a total solution: 
You could simply will your assets to your spouse and hope that he or she 
will then pass them on to your heirs. But suppose the spouse has children 
from another marriage: will they also get a piece or even most of your 
estate? Or suppose your spouse is terrible with money and you wonder 
whether your estate will survive long enough to make it to your  
children . . . . The QTIP can be a perfect remedy for these concerns.165 
The problem is that this marketing strategy—to say nothing of the legal 
contours of the trust itself—is “rooted in the prejudices and stereotypes of the 
1960s and can only be explained as . . . gender-biased [and] paternalistic.”166 Going 
 
160. ROBERTS, supra note 153. 
161. Delafuente, supra note 156.  
162. Id.  
163. Trust Basics, PRESSER L. FIRM, http://www.assetprotectionattorneys.com/Domestic_ 
Asset_Protection/Irrevocable_Trusts.aspx [perma.cc/2KHK-Z7YY] ( last visited Jan. 23, 2017) 
(emphasis in original). 
164. Gary Plessl & Kevin Houser, Do You Need a Trust for Your Estate Plan?, NEXTAVENUE 
(May 13, 2015), http://www.nextavenue.org/do-you-need-a-trust-for-your-estate-plan [perma.cc/
6VUL-Z8KA]. 
165. Id. 
166. See GERZOG, supra note 57; Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the Qtip Trust and 
the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729 (1997-1998) (“There is no doubt that the QTIP 
device diminishes the autonomy of wives and widows, who statistically are the usual beneficiaries of 
QTIP trusts. The wife or widow is deprived of any power to control the disposition of the property, 
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even further, the QTIP and the way in which it is marketed signal a return to the 
supremacy of family wealth preservation and the days of dower, when the husband’s 
task was to “ensure that his widow [would] not squander the estate or disinherit the 
decedent’s children.”167  
2. Self-Settled DAPTs: Spouses Hiding Assets from Spouses 
While QTIP trusts give one spouse the ability to limit the financial reach and 
power of the other spouse at death, there are also new trust forms that allow one 
spouse to shelter assets from the other at divorce. This Section provides a brief 
description of how these trusts work and a history of how these trusts have been 
authorized by state legislatures across the country. Subsequently, the Section offers 
an analysis of not only how the trusts are beginning to show up on court dockets 
but also how they are being sold as an alternative to prenuptial agreements. 
a. Domesticating Asset Protection Trusts 
Almost a century after the last gasps of the separate estate, self-settled asset 
protection trusts are back. These trusts allow the settlor to be a beneficiary (and 
even a trustee, under certain circumstances). That is to say, one spouse can place 
assets in trust and then not only receive distributions as the beneficiary of the trust, 
but also serve as one of the trustees charged with exercising discretion over those 
distributions. Furthermore, the assets in trust will be protected from creditors, 
including spouses. This development is surprising, to say the least, because—apart 
from the separate estate, which rested on unique policy grounds168—self-settled 
trusts have never been asset protection trusts.  
The traditional rule for asset protection has been that, in order for a 
beneficiary’s interest to be protected, the trust needed to be created by a third party. 
The policy reason has always been thus: 
To hold otherwise would be to give unexampled opportunity to 
unscrupulous persons to shelter their property before engaging in 
speculative business enterprises, to mislead creditors into thinking that the 
settlor still owned the property since he appeared to be receiving its 
income, and thereby work a gross fraud on creditors who might place 
reliance on the former prosperity and financial stability of the debtor.169 
This traditional rule is codified in the Uniform Trust Code, which states that 
an individual cannot shield assets from creditors, including spouses, by placing them 
 
and the property is usually in trust, which deprives her of administrative control. QTIP trusts implement 
the husband’s dead-hand control.”). 
167. Khang, supra note 58, at 353. 
168. The separate estate looks different from a public policy point of view because it was a 
necessary way of giving married women property rights at a time when they had none. 
169. G.T. Bogert, TRUSTS § 40, at 155–56 (6th ed. 1987); see also Henery J. Lischer, Domestic 
Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 479 (2000). 
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in a trust for her own benefit.170 Accordingly, “even if the trust is discretionary, 
spendthrift, or both, the settlor’s creditors can reach the maximum amount that the 
trustee could under any circumstances pay to the settlor or apply for the  
settlor’s benefit.”171 
This longstanding rule began to crumble in the 1980s when the Cook Islands 
amended governing law to allow for self-settled asset protection trusts in order to 
attract foreign capital.172 The Cayman Islands, Belize, Nevis, the Channel Islands, 
the Isle of Man, and other offshore jurisdictions followed suit, “and the great 
Offshore Boom of the 1990s came like a tidal wave.”173 These trusts were known 
as “Foreign Asset Protection Trusts” (FAPTs).174 Unhappy with the loss in trust 
business that resulted, American states fought back. In 1997 Alaska enacted 
legislation that allowed for the first Domestic Asset Protection Trusts (DAPTs). 
Ninety days later, the Delaware legislature did the same, stating that the new rules 
were “intended to maintain Delaware’s role as the most favored domestic 
jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts.”175 Since that time, sixteen other states 
have passed legislation authorizing DAPTs.176 These states compete with one 
another and with offshore trust companies for business, and are ranked annually by 
various law practices and legal commentators according to the strength of the asset 
protection that they offer.177 
In these rankings, one particularly important factor is how much protection 
state DAPT laws provide against creditor spouses, and states offer various 
 
170. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 (2000). 
171. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 81, at 703. The reporter for the Restatement on 
Trusts wrote, “it is well settled that where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision 
restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his transferee or creditor can reach his 
interest.” See Ritchie W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The “Estate Planning Tool of the 
Decade” or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 167 (2013).  
172. Sterk, supra note 17, at 16. To that end, the statute included a number of measures that 
made the Cook Islands a favorite trust situs for settlors seeking to avoid creditor claims. 
        173.      Jay Adkisson, A Short History of Asset Protection Trust Law, FORBES, (Jan. 26, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2015/01/26/a-short-history-of-asset-protection-trust-
law/#605ecd2f3fb4 [https://perma.cc/LD83-ND5Z]. 
174. See FOREIGN ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS, https://www.lodmell.com/asset-protection/
foreign-trusts [perma.cc/5CVM-L9HZ] ( last visited July 23, 2017). 
175. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 81, at 705. Alaska and Delaware have not been shy 
in expressing their respective desire to become the leading trust jurisdiction-not only domestically but 
also as an alternative to the offshore jurisdictions which have garnered so much world-wide business in 
the last several years. John K. Eason, Home from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives 
Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L. REV. 41, 53 (2000). 
176. Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming, and West Virginia have also enacted legislation 
validating APTs. Following the 1986 creation of the GST exemption, states have similarly raced to 
change or abolish the rule against perpetuities and compete for dynasty trust business. Roughly $100 
billion in trust assets has migrated into states that have provided for dynasty trusts. 
177. STATE RANKINGS CHARTS, https://www.oshins.com/state-rankings-charts [perma.cc/
4HC3-CQP7] ( last visited July 16, 2017); Ashlea Ebeling, Comparing Domestic Asset Protection 
Trust States, FORBES ( July 6, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2016/07/06/
comparing-domestic-asset-protection-trust-states/#7caed6a765fe [perma.cc/4VXK-E7HY]. 
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competitive opportunities to shield assets from marital property and spousal 
support claims. Nevada, for example “has apparently chosen to be even more 
competitive by providing for no statutory creditor exceptions [including spouses] 
to the self-settled spendthrift trust features of its legislation.”178 Oklahoma laws, 
likewise, bar spouses from access to trust assets at divorce, as does Wyoming.179 
Wyoming DAPT law even shields trust assets from spousal and child support claims 
when the settlor is thirty days or more in default.180 Other states give more weight 
to spousal claims, but doing so lowers their ranking and may make their jurisdiction 
less attractive for trust formation purposes.  
DAPTs, then, are a financial instrument that specifically promise asset 
protection to divorcing spouses—contrary to general concepts not only of marriage 
law but also public policy. And, by enabling one spouse to actively shelter assets 
from the other, DAPTs force economic partnership to give way to family wealth 
preservation of a new and particularly objectionable sort.  
b. Family Conflict/Conflict of Law 
Whether or not these protections hold up in court is, of course, another 
question and one that has yet to be thoroughly tested. Because of the state 
competition for business, one of the first legal issues arising with DAPTs is choice 
of law. Because states advertise their DAPTs as having unique forms of asset 
protection, trust agreements generally contain provisions stating that the trust is 
subject exclusively to the law of the state in which it was created.181 Spouses have, 
however, been challenging these exclusive provisions during divorce proceedings, 
in the hopes of eliminating some of the most aggressive asset protection provisions 
and rendering the trust assets subject to inclusion in the marital estate. 
Such was the case in Dahl v. Dahl. In that case, Charles and Kim Dahl were 
married and lived in Utah for almost eighteen years before filing for divorce and 
beginning proceedings that the district court called a “train wreck.”182 Charles was 
a cardiologist and Kim had worked for a short time at the beginning of the marriage 
before becoming a stay-at-home parent and the primary caretaker of two children.183 
In 2002, four years before Charles filed for divorce, he created the Dahl Family 
Irrevocable Trust in Nevada, naming himself as beneficiary, his brother C. Robert 
Dahl as Investment Trustee, and the Nevada State Bank as a co-trustee. Nevada 
was listed as place of domicile in the trust’s choice of law provision. Charles funded 
 
178. See Edward D. Brown & Hudson Mead, Divorce and the Self-Settled Trust: Insights Into 
How-and Where-Clients Might Protect Their Trust Assets From Financial Risk of a Future Divorce 2, 
FEATURE: EST. PLAN. & TAX’N (Feb. 2014), http://www.barryengel.com/pdf/divorce-self-settled-
trust.pdf [perma.cc/7BLV-6YHD]. 
 179.    STATE RANKINGS CHARTS, supra note 177.  
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶ 5, 345 P.3d 566, 575. 
183. Id. at ¶ 3, 345 P.3d at 575. 
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the trust with 97% of a Utah LLC, Marlette Enterprises—a real estate investment 
company that he owned and that was valued at approximately $1 million. In the 
following year, the couple jointly transferred deed to their primary residence to  
the trust.  
When the marriage failed and the couple began divorce proceedings, Kim 
sought a share of assets in trust, claiming they were marital property. The Utah 
district court held that Kim had no enforceable interest in trust assets not only 
because of the choice-of-law provision but also because the trust was irrevocable.184 
On appeal, however, the Utah Supreme Court disagreed. Kim’s interest in the 
marital home was undeniably marital property, the court observed, and there was 
an open question as to what, if any, percentage of the real estate company was 
marital property.185 Charles admitted that at least some part of the trust assets were 
marital property and, consequently, the court stated: “Thus, to the extent that the 
Trust corpus contains marital property, Utah has a strong interest in ensuring that 
such property is equitably divided in the parties’ divorce action.”186 The court 
therefore denied enforcing the trust’s choice-of-law provision and applied Utah law 
instead.  
Applying Utah law, the court concluded that the trust assets were reachable 
and subject in part to equitable distribution, primarily because the court determined 
that the trust was revocable—not irrevocable as Charles claimed. The trust 
agreement stated: “The Trust hereby established is irrevocable. Settlor reserves any 
power whatsoever to alter or amend any of the terms or provisions hereof.”187 As 
William Lapiana and others have pointed out: “[T]his provision may contain a 
typographical error—if one substitutes ‘no’ for ‘any,’ the phrase not only reads as 
more natural but makes sense as a provision in an irrevocable trust.”188 The court 
never ruled, then, on whether or not the assets would have been reachable by Kim 
had the trust been irrevocable, and a drafting error may have cost Charles dearly.  
Another similar case, IMO Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust, likewise involved a 
family business and a marital property dispute, both entwined with a protracted legal 
battle over the assets in trust.189 In the Kloiber case, the trust was a dynasty trust, a 
 
184. Id. at ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 577. 
185. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27, 345 P.3d at 579. In addition, Ms. Dahl claims to have conveyed to the Trust 
her interest in Marlette Enterprises and other marital property with a value of at least $2 million. 
186. Id. at ¶ 22, 345 P.3d at 578. 
187. Id. at ¶ 30, 345 P.3d at 580. 
188. William Lapiana, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust at Divorce (“The lesson from Dahl is 
that the key to achieving asset protection through a Nevada asset protection trust is to ensure that 
Nevada law will be applied to the trust.”). 
189. For more on the divorce, see Jay Adkisson, Delaware Anti-Suit Injunction Nixed as to 
Dynasty Trust in Kloiber, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2014/
08/18/delaware-anti-suit-injunction-nixed-as-to-dynasty-trust-in-kloiber/6/#6bb14c77328b 
[perma.cc/94WX-WC5J]. 
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particular form of a DAPT.190 And, although the trust was created by a third party 
(the father), several features of the case mirror first-party-settled DAPT cases, in 
particular the deep involvement of the husband/beneficiary with the trust, his 
control over the trust, and the transfer of his business—a quasi-marital asset—into 
the trust during the marriage.  
The trust in question was a Delaware Dynasty Trust, that Glenn Kloiber had 
created in 2002 with PNC bank for the benefit of his son, Daniel Kloiber. As the 
primary beneficiary, Daniel had the right to withdraw up to five percent of the net 
fair market value of the trust estate annually.191 Daniel was also given special powers 
of appointment192 and was named as a “special trustee,” with sole authority to direct 
the trustee in regards to investment decisions, distributions, and trustee removal and 
selection.193 The trust, therefore, offered maximum asset protection and tax benefit 
while still giving Daniel significant control over the assets.  
Glenn initially funded the trust at creation with the small sum of approximately 
$15,000. Less than a year later, Daniel sold 99.45% of his shares in the company he 
had founded and co-owned, Exstream Software, Inc., to the trust for “an unsecured 
promissory note with a face amount of $6 million.”194 By 2008, the trust had sold 
all of this stock for approximately $310 million.195 Consequently, although a third 
party (the father), technically created the trust, it looked much more like a self-
settled DAPT because of the trustee powers and beneficiary rights that Daniel held 
coupled with the fact that the majority of the trust assets were proceeds from the 
sale of his company.196  
When the couple separated in 2010 and Daniel filed for divorce, Beth argued 
that the trust assets were marital property. The divorce was being litigated in 
Kentucky, where the couple resided, and the Kentucky court presiding over the 
divorce entered a Status Quo order, providing: “[N]either party shall sell, encumber, 
gift, bequeath or in any manner transfer, convey or dissipate any property, cash, 
 
190. Dynasty trusts are like traditional third-party created asset protection trusts, but they are 
created in jurisdictions that offer enhanced asset protection and exemption from the rule against 
perpetuities.  
191. “In addition, the Trustee ‘shall pay to or apply for [Dan’s] benefit’ such amounts as ‘shall 
be necessary or advisable from time to time for [Dan’s] health, education, support and maintenance.’ 
Id. § 1.1.3. The Trustee also may use funds from the trust estate to provide and maintain a personal 
residence for Dan. Id. § 1.1.7.” In re Kloiber, 98 A.3d 924, 929 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
192. That permitted him to appoint the principal of the trust estate to the “wife of the Grantor’s 
son,” to his blood relations, or to a charitable organization. Id. 
193. The Special Trustee possessed powers including the following: “Sole authority to direct 
the Trustee with respect to investment of the trust estate, id. § 9.1; Sole authority to direct the Trustee 
with respect to Special Holdings, id. § 9.2; Sole authority to direct the Trustee with respect to 
discretionary distributions, id. § 9.3; and Sole authority to remove and replace the Trustee, id. § 9.4.”  
Id. at 931–32. 
194. Id. at 932. 
195. Id. 
196. Jocelyn Margolin Borowsky & Richard W. Nenno, Myths and Facts About Kloiber, 
MARTINDALE.COM (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.martindale.com/family-law/article_Duane-Morris-
LLP_2242706.htm [perma.cc/8DD3-MLJV]. 
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stocks or other assets currently in their possession or control of another person, 
company, legal entity or family member.”197 After the court issued these orders, 
Daniel resigned as Special Trustee—transferring the power to his son—and PNC 
filed a petition seeking a declaration that the Delaware courts had exclusive 
jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the administration of the trust. Daniel and 
PNC argued that the relevant Delaware rules provided that: “The Court of Chancery 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any action brought with respect to a qualified 
disposition.”198 Daniel and PNC argued for “the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ of this court 
to the exclusion of all other courts in the world, including the Kentucky Family 
Court.”199 
Unpersuaded by PNC’s argument, the Delaware court concluded that the 
statutory language about “exclusive jurisdiction” meant only that the Delaware 
Court of Chancery possessed exclusive jurisdiction with respect to other Delaware 
courts. The statute, the court remarked, “is allocating jurisdiction among the 
Delaware courts. The state is not making a claim against the world that no court 
outside of Delaware can exercise jurisdiction over that type of case.”200 In 
conclusion, the court remarked: “This case differs from a situation where parties 
have agreed voluntarily by contract to an exclusive forum. Beth did not execute the 
Trust Agreement, nor is there any indication that she chose explicitly or implicitly 
to become bound by its terms.”201 
After much back and forth, the final divorce settlement severed some portion 
(an undisclosed amount) of the assets in trust in order to form a new trust for Beth, 
and the question of whether any portion of the trust assets were marital property 
was thus avoided. This end result, while leaving open the legal question of marital 
assets in trust, represented a blow for the husband as well as the trust company.202 
In this respect, the result hints at the possibility that family wealth preservation will 
not completely overtake marital partnership.203 The question, however, is still far 
from settled. Moreover, the clear trend is for states to adopt these types of asset 
 
197. In re Kloiber, 98 A.3d 924, 933 (Del. Ch. 2014). A subsequent order additionally prohibited 
Daniel from “taking action to facilitate, request or procure any change in any of the liquid, cash or cash 
equivalent investments within the [dynasty trust], or within the entities within the [dynasty trust].” 
198. Id. at 938 (citing 12 Del. C. § 3572(a)) (emphasis added in opinion). 
199. Id.  
200. Id. at 939 (concluding not only that Delaware did not have exclusive jurisdiction, but also 
that Delaware did not have primary jurisdiction). 
201. Id. at 940 (citing Garretson v. Garretson, 306 A.2d 737, 740 (Del. 1973)). 
202. Steven J. Oshins, Beware of Rights of Beneficiary’s Divorcing Spouse in Delaware, INFORMA 
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/beware-rights-beneficiary-s-
divorcing-spouse-delaware [perma.cc/AAW9-HFUV]. 
203. Courts have found against granting jurisdiction to the state of trust settlement in others 
creditor contexts. Notably in In re Huber, a case about a real estate developer trying to shield his assets 
through the use of a DAPT. At least one commentator has argued that these types of trusts should be 
protected as a matter of supporting trustor intent. See Brendan Duffy, In States We “Trust”: Self-Settled 
Trusts, Public Policy, and Interstate Federalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 205 (2016).  
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protection trusts and the more states that adopt them, the less important the 
jurisdictional question will be. 
c. New and Improved Prenuptial Agreements 
 Despite these recent court challenges, the enhanced protections that 
DAPTs offer against spousal claims in the event of divorce mean that estate and 
financial planners are heavily marketing DAPTs as a new and improved alternative 
to prenuptial agreements. In fact, trust-based premarital arrangements are quite 
literally being marketed as direct competitors to contract-based prenuptial 
agreements. The contract-based way of doing things, so the story goes, involved 
awkward and prolonged drafting and there were many obstacles to successful 
negotiation. According to one estate lawyer: “Prenuptial agreements are good, but 
there are numerous personal and legal issues that deter couples from actually 
executing a prenuptial agreement.”204 DAPTs, according to the same narrative, 
present a better and more compelling opportunity to engage in significant family 
wealth preservation because of the robust asset protection offered by the DAPT at 
divorce and because one soon-to-be spouse can create a DAPT without the 
knowledge of the other. 
A major selling point for trust companies and estate planning firms in all of 
the nineteen states that allow DAPTs is the exceptional asset protection they can 
offer at divorce.205 Delaware trust companies advertise “extra breaks, including 
stronger protection from creditors and potential exclusion of assets in divorce 
proceedings.”206 Another law firm suggests the use of DAPTs, because “utilizing 
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts in the pre-marital planning process greatly 
reduces the chances of a successful attack resulting in the equitable distribution of 
property brought to the marriage.”207 Some estate planners, in a more whimsical 
vein, give names to their financial products. For example, the “Ultimate Cowboy 
Cocktail” is a Wyoming LLC that is owned by a Wyoming Asset Protection Trust 
and administered by a Wyoming Private Trust Company, and it is advertised as 
 
204. Richard Shapiro et al., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts v. Prenuptial Agreements, BLUSTEIN, 
SHAPIRO, RICH & BARONE, LLP (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.mid-hudsonlaw.com/blog/domestic-
asset-protection-trusts-v-prenuptial-agreements/ [perma.cc/B89F-UK3J]. Of course, “The safest bet, 
say advisers, is to combine asset-protection structures with prenuptial agreements—what lawyers call 
the ‘belts and suspenders’ approach.” 
205. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
206. Dynasty Trusts Let U.S. Wealthy Duck Estate, Gift Taxes Forever, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
( July 28, 2011), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/dynasty-trusts-let-us-wealthy-duck-estate-gift-taxes-
forever--7913.html [perma.cc/VQR4-R5Q4]. In states that have not adopted the UTC, local rules do 
not generally dictate any exceptions for spouse creditors. 
207. Use of Asset Protection Trusts in the Pre-Marital Planning Process, MCKONLY & ASBURY, 
http://www.macpas.com/use-of-asset-protection-trusts-in-the-pre-marital-planning-process/ 
[perma.cc/S2JX-SWHB?type=image] ( last visited July 16, 2017). 
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offering strong asset protection during divorce proceedings.208 Marketing for 
Nevada trust companies is simple: “Nevada is one of two states that have no 
exception creditors. This includes divorcing spouses.”209 Doubling down on this 
focus on asset protection at divorce, trust companies and law firms also consistently 
characterize spouses as overreaching and unduly entitled. 
In addition to emphasizing heavy-duty asset protection, trust companies and 
estate planners also market DAPTs by highlighting that—unlike prenuptial 
agreements—they can be created by one fiancé without the knowledge of the other. 
From this perspective, DAPTs are a good alternative to pre-marital contracts 
because they help fiancés avoid “awkward” conversations about money and the 
retention of separate property. A dynasty trust in Delaware, for example, serves “as 
a substitute for prenuptial agreements, offering protection of the pre-marital estate 
of an individual without negotiations over a prenuptial agreement.”210 One estate 
lawyer explains the problem with prenuptial agreements: “The bottom line is 
that while many couples are delighted to share their lives together when entering 
into a marriage, they may feel uncomfortable sharing information about their 
net worth.”211 A commentator writing in the American Bar Association newsletter 
also describes the utility of the DAPT by underscoring the “low-stress” angle: “This 
technique is very appealing to many individuals who, although [they] would like to 
protect their assets from their future spouse . . . would like to do so quietly and 
without any hassle.”212 
Putting a more positive spin on the desire to avoid potentially uncomfortable 
conversations about finances, estate planners and trust firms also promote the 
DAPT as the “romantic” alternative. Prenuptial agreements, the advertisements 
pronounce, kill the romance and joy of wedding planning. DAPTs, on the other 
hand, keep the romance alive. The following is typical of the DAPT promotion 
literature: 
[O]ne individual can enact premarital asset protection planning without his 
or her fiancé’s involvement. Due to the unromantic pitfalls of negotiating 
a family property settlement the week of the wedding, some proactive 
 
208. The Seven Tiers of Asset Protection Planning: http://appersondev.melloncg.net/
images/7_Tiers_of_Asset_Protection_Planning.pdf [perma.cc/9LT9-C8RZ] (#5 is the Cowboy 
Cocktail and #6 is the Ultimate Cowboy Cocktail). 
209. The 4 Things You Need to Know About a Nevada Asset Protection Trust, PREMIER TRUST, 
https://premiertrust.com/2016/12/30/the-4-things-you-need-to-know-about-a-nevada-asset-
protection-trust/ [perma.cc/M68T-C9QZ] ( last visited July 17, 2017). 
210. Northern Trust, Delaware Trusts: Safeguarding Personal Assets (2019), https://
www.northerntrust.com/documents/white-papers/wealth-management/research/delaware-trusts-
safeguarding-personal-wealth.pdf?bc=25683840 [perma.cc/5SJ5-XE3H]. 
211. Shapiro, supra note 204. 
212. Kalimah Z. White, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: An Alternative to Prenuptial 
Agreements 2 (Feb. 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news 
_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/domestictrust.html [perma.cc/W9B7-4657]. Of course, “The 
safest bet, say advisers, is to combine asset-protection structures with prenuptial agreements—what 
lawyers call the ‘belts and suspenders’ approach.” 
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individuals are avoiding the prenup altogether. The domestic asset 
protection trust is the single best alternative a single person can take to 
protect his or her assets from divorce.213 
A Dallas estate lawyer also focuses on the romance aspect, stating: “Many 
wealthy individuals choose to forgo a prenup altogether, for fear that it will dim the 
ardor of romance—and for them a premarital trust is a good alternative.”214 And 
another trust lawyer echoes this sentiment: “As a practical matter, asking a future 
spouse to enter into a prenuptial agreement often causes discomfort to blossoming 
love relationships.”215 
DAPT marketing, then, underscores the fact that these trusts are highly 
suitable for marriage planning and that they offer benefits in terms of secrecy and 
efficiency that contract-based forms of marriage settlement do not. This marketing 
strongly stresses family wealth preservation over marital partnership and treats the 
spouse or soon-to-be spouse as nothing more than a potential liability and drain on 
family resources.  
III. SAFEGUARDING MARITAL ECONOMIES 
It is clear that QTIPs, DAPTs, and some dynasty trusts represent a new kind 
of incursion against marital partnership. What remains is the question of how to 
recalibrate the balance between family wealth preservation and marital partnership. 
In this Part, after describing the insufficiency of current protections, I propose 
several solutions to help rebuild the integrity of both the family wealth preservation 
and marital partnership value-spheres by placing constraints on what one spouse 
can do unilaterally in terms of trust creation and funding. In particular, I suggest 
ways to better regulate the ability of one spouse to engage in asset preservation 
through various forms of disclosure and consent requirements. The new marriage 
trusts—the “have your cake and eat it too”216 type of trusts—should not be allowed 
to operate as unrestrained vehicles for spousal disempowerment and marital fraud.  
A. The Current Limits of Trust Creation: Fraudulent Transfers 
 As things currently stand, there are some constraints on and limits to what 
one spouse can transfer into trust during marriage. The most common challenges 
to these transfers that disinherit spouses and defraud the marital estate arise from 
the fraudulent transfer doctrine, which “represents the dominant approach for 
identifying and remedying sham transactions.”217 Fraudulent transfers may be 
challenged pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (amended in 2014 to 
 
 213. Divorce Asset Protection, ASSET PROTECTION PLANNERS, http://assetprotection 
planners.com/articles/divorce//[perma.cc/GR2R-DVWF] ( last visited July 16, 2017). 
214. Id.  
215. Shapiro, supra note 201. 
216. HYCET, supra note 12. 
217. Alexander Boni-Saenz & Reid Kress Weisbord, Sham and Remedial Doctrines, 22 TR. & 
TR. 850, 852 (2016). 
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become the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), which states that transfers will be 
void if they were made with the intent to defraud or if “badges of fraud” are 
present.218 The fraudulent transfer doctrine enables recovery for a spouse in the 
case of extreme behavior and actual fraud. There are, however, problems that 
remain. The following two sections explain the limits of the doctrine and what types 
of cases still fall between the cracks, leaving a disinherited or impoverished spouse 
with little recourse.  
1. “Badges of Fraud” and the Surviving Spouse 
One substantial problem with using the conventional fraudulent transfer 
standard is the difficulty of proving intent to defraud. As a result, courts are 
commonly faced with the problem of identifying indicia of fraud, or what most 
courts call “badges of fraud.” And, in the context of estate planning, spouses are 
generally allowed great latitude before something becomes a badge of fraud. For 
example, courts do not think it is necessarily inappropriate that one spouse transfers 
assets to someone other than his spouse in the course of estate planning, especially 
if the recipient is a child or other relation.  
Typical is the case of Karsenty v. Schoukroun, in which the surviving spouse 
claimed that assets transferred from the decedent spouse to his daughter using a 
revocable trust were fraudulently transferred.219 The proper question, the court 
remarked, was whether the transaction was a “sham” and therefore invalid.220 As a 
threshold matter, the court stated, “[A] surviving spouse must show that the 
decedent retained an interest in or otherwise continued to enjoy the transferred 
property.”221 If the decedent retained an interest, the court then would look to see 
if the decedent had a sound estate planning reason for making the transfer in such 
a way as to retain an interest. Factors in the analysis also included the degree to 
which the transfer “deprives a surviving spouse of property that she or he would 
otherwise take as part of the decedent’s estate,”222 and “the familial relationship 
between the decedent and the person or persons who benefit by the challenged inter 
vivos transfer.”223 The court noted in particular the legitimacy of transfers providing 
for children from a previous marriage.224 Looking at the question from this 
perspective, the court concluded that the transfer from the decedent to his daughter 
 
218.  Fifteen  states  have  enacted  the UVTA, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title 
=Voidable%20Transactions%20Act%20Amendments%20(2014)%20 %20Formerly%20Fraudulent%
20Transfer%20Act [perma.cc/Y87E-SLR9]. Only Rhode Island is a DAPT state. See Amy Amundsen, 
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts in Divorce Litigation, 29 AAML 1, 25 (2016). 
219. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1158 (Md. 2008). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 1176. 
223. Id. at 1179.  
224. Id. (explaining that these types of transfers within blended families, the court said, were to 
be viewed “differently than they would view a similar transaction in a single-family unit”). 
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from a previous marriage was done in good faith and that “the court must respect 
the estate planning arrangements of the decedent.”225 
For a transfer to be fraudulent, the circumstances are usually quite extreme. In 
an Arkansas case, In re Estate of Thompson, the court set aside a transfer after 
concluding that it was made with the intent of disinheriting the surviving spouse.226 
At the outset, the court noted that Arkansas law was “well settled” in that the 
surviving spouse’s elective interest vested only in property that the deceased spouse 
owned at the time of death.227 The court went on to remark, however, that because 
“the surviving spouse’s right to an elective share is inviolate,” the court would set 
aside any transfers found to be made with fraudulent intent.228 The trial court had 
found fraudulent intent based on the fact that the husband had transferred more 
than $6 million to a revocable trust just prior to his death in 2010, leaving his spouse 
nothing more than a bequest of $100,000 that was contingent upon her not 
contesting the will.229 The trial court also determined that, in previous iterations of 
his estate plan, the husband had provided generously for his spouse and that it was 
only in the final version of his will that he had redrafted the terms “in order to leave 
her basically nothing.”230 Concluding that the decedent’s actions had been meant to 
disinherit the surviving spouse in retribution for placing the decedent in a care 
facility, the court allowed the trust assets to be included in the decedent’s probate 
estate “for the limited purpose of calculating the elective share.”231 
Transfers, then, are not fraudulent if there is a legitimate estate planning aim. 
This is particularly true when blended families come into play and the surviving 
spouse is perceived or assumed to have financial interests that differ from the 
decedent’s children. Fraudulent transfer rules can, then, serve as a nominal 
safeguard for a surviving spouse’s financial interests. They do not, however, fully 
safeguard economic partnership at death. 
2. Fraudulent Transfers at Divorce 
The fraudulent transfer doctrine also protects spouses at divorce. Typical 
statutes render void transfers made “with intent to delay, hinder, or defraud 
creditors, purchasers, or other persons of or from what they are or may be lawfully 
 
225. Id. at 1172. 
226. In re Estate of Thompson, 434 S.W.3d 877, 881–82 (Ark. 2014). 
227. Id. Arkansas law gives a surviving spouse the right to elect to take a share of the estate of 
his or her deceased spouse against the will of the deceased. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28–39–401. This 
elective share is the equivalent of the spouse’s dower or curtesy rights, as well as any homestead rights 
and statutory allowances.  
228. In re Estate of Thompson, 434 S.W.3d at 883. 
229. Id. at 884–85. 
230. Id. at 885. 
231. Id. at 887, reh’g denied ( June 19, 2014) (explaining that the court also noted that “[t]he 
intent to defeat the marital rights or the elective share will not invalidate any other lawful purpose of 
the trust”). 
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entitled to,”232 and this includes spouses as creditor. As with transfers made as part 
of estate planning, however, it is difficult for one spouse to prove actual intent to 
defraud. Therefore, courts maintain the focus on “badges of fraud” and, with 
divorce, look in particular to timing.233 
In a 2003 case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, for example, the court 
was called upon to evaluate transfers that the husband made into an Offshore Asset 
Protection Trust (OAPT) in the Bahamas. The court noted that “common badges 
of fraud include . . . lack or inadequacy of consideration, close familial relationship 
or friendship among the parties, retention of possession or benefit of the property 
transferred, the financial condition of the transferor both before and after the 
transfer, the chronology of events surrounding the transfer, the transfer takes place 
during the pendency or threat of litigations, and hurried or secret transactions.”234 
The husband had created a family trust in the Bahamas in November of 1995, when 
the couple was having marital difficulties, and “transferred a substantial portion of 
the marital assets to the trust.”235 One year later, the wife filed for divorce and in 
April of 1997 the couple definitively separated. After the creation of the trust and 
up until the divorce hearings, the husband continued to makes transfers into trust. 
During the divorce proceedings, the wife challenged these transfers as fraudulent.  
Considering the previous list of badges of fraud, the court agreed with the 
wife. The court found particularly troubling the fact that the husband had created 
the trust and retained significant control over the assets. The trust allowed the 
husband to be named as a beneficiary, and the husband retained control over 
distributions to the extent that income was taxable to him and “the family trust 
assets would be included in his estate should he die.”236 The timing and creation of 
the trust were also suspect, given that the husband created the trust “in secret”237 
only after the marital troubles began and continued to transfers assets into it up 
until the time of the property division hearing. Consequently, the court affirmed 
the trial court ruling that the transfers were made with the intent to defraud the 
wife.238  
The biggest problem with the fraudulent transfer doctrine is that only the most 
egregious types of transfers are penalized—after the fact—and one of the most 
determinative factors tends to be timing. If the couple is separated and divorce 
 
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (West 2019); see Buchanan v. Buchanan, 585 S.E.2d 533, 535  
(Va. 2003). 
233. “Circumstantial evidence of intent in these cases also often takes the form of certain badges 
of fraud. We have defined badges of fraud as “a fact tending to throw suspicion upon the questioned 
transaction, excites distrust as to bona fides, raises an inference that a conveyance is fraudulent and by 
its presence usually requires a showing of good faith.” Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d 587, 592–
93 (Wyo. 2003). 
234. Id. at 593. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 590. 
237. Id. at 594. 
238. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d at 593. For another example, see Buchanan v. Buchanan, 585 S.E.2d 
533, 535 (Va. 2003). 
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proceedings are in the works, courts are much more likely to conclude that a 
questionable transfer is fraudulent. However, if one spouse makes a transfer during 
an intact marriage, it likely will not be flagged and treated as a fraudulent. A better 
alternative is required. 
B. Rejecting Unilateral Decision-making 
More useful than the focus on fraudulent transfers, and more apt in the 
marriage context, is a regulatory framework premised on limiting the powers of one 
spouse to act unilaterally at any point in preparation for or during marriage. 
Economic partnership within marriage necessitates certain forms of joint decision-
making, and financial and estate planning should ideally be collaborative terrain or, 
at the very least, consultative. Economic partnership entails both spouses not only 
knowing about wealth planning activities that impact the couple but also having a 
voice with respect to the selection of various financial products. A set of rules 
limiting unilateral action would help to re-establish the current boundary that 
separates family wealth preservation from economic partnership, and support the 
conventional demarcation of these two value-spheres. This section suggests several 
ex ante methods for increasing and enhancing joint decision-making about marital 
wealth.  
1. QTIPs: Choosing Collaborative Decision-Making 
Rejecting unilateral decision-making in the case of QTIPs is a modest fix: the 
title-holding spouse or that spouse’s executor should not be able to put assets in 
trust or make the QTIP election without the consent of the other spouse. Currently, 
the donor spouse or the donor’s executor can choose to make the QTIP election 
regardless of what the surviving spouse wants.239 If the QTIP is an inter vivos trust, 
the donor spouse makes the election by filing a gift tax QTIP election form; if the 
QTIP is created at the donor’s death, the executor makes the election when filing 
the federal estate tax form. In either situation, the spouse has no official role in the 
process and her consent is neither required nor even recommended. Wendy Gerzog 
has previously proposed the seemingly simple solution that the surviving spouse be 
the one to make the election. Gerzog states:  
If the widow, rather than the donor or executor, held the QTIP election 
power, she would have greater involvement in the QTIP process, and the 
marital nature of the provisions would be stronger. In addition, this change 
 
239. I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(v), 2523(0(4). In the context of estate tax marital deduction, the 
executor must make the election on the last timely-filed return. In the case of the gift tax marital 
deduction, the donor must make the election on the last timely-filed gift tax return. Once the election 
is made, it is irrevocable. See Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(b)(4), 20.2056(b)-7(c), 25.2523(f)-(b)(3); see 
also Gerzog, supra note 57 (“However, there is no requirement that the donee spouse participate in any 
way in this decision.”). 
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would demonstrate more effectively that the QTIP provisions attempt to 
protect the transfer of “their” property from current taxation.240 
Making the surviving spouse the one to elect for QTIP treatment of a trust—
or requiring her consent in some form—would recognize marital partnership and 
instantiate joint economic decision-making on the couple’s part. In addition, this 
modification would recognize the fact that, in many cases, the trust assets are marital 
property.  
QTIPs could still serve their purpose by facilitating estate planning in blended 
families and family wealth preservation could continue almost unabated—except 
for the required procurement of spousal consent.  
2. DAPTs: Constraining the Self in Self-Settled 
The same principle of reforming rules that authorize unilateral action should 
also be applied to DAPT creation and regulation within marriage. DAPTs that allow 
one spouse to unilaterally create the trust and shelter assets directly contravene the 
notion of economic partnership and represent an inappropriate intervention of 
wealth preservation into the marital economy. Consequently, as states both enact 
and modify DAPT rules and as courts begin to address their asset protection 
capacities, values of collaborative decision-making and consent should be placed 
front and center. Aligned with the notion of marital partnership, states should 
require affirmative spousal consent for transfers into DAPTs and, in the absence 
of affirmative spousal consent, these transfers should be subject to judicial scrutiny 
at divorce in order to determine whether they consist of marital property.  
To begin, one spouse should not be able to create or transfer assets into a 
DAPT during marriage without notice and consent. Estate planners generally 
recommend: “[A] DAPT should not be established when your client’s life is in 
turmoil and this would include immediately prior or after a divorce action has been 
initiated.”241 DAPTs, they suggest, should be funded “either well before entering 
into the marriage or [in some states] during a stable marriage.”242 Cautions against 
trust formation during or just previous to divorce are not sufficient, however, to 
regulate unilateral trust creation and wealth decision-making within marriage. 
Currently, South Dakota is the only DAPT state with a statutory requirement for 
this type of notification. In South Dakota, marital property transferred into the 
DAPT is protected at divorce, but only if the spouse received notice in the form 
provided by the statute or provided written consent after having received 
 
240. Wendy C. Gerzog, Solutions to the Sexist QTIP Provisions, 35 REAL PROP. PROB &  
TR. J. 97, 107 (2000); see also Gerzog, supra note 57, at 327; Wendy C. Gerzog, Illogical and Sexist QTIP 
Provisions: I Just Can’t Say It Ain’t So, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (1998). 
241. A Legal Guide to Domestic Asset Protection Trusts and Divorce, LAWFIRMS, http://
www.lawfirms.com/resources/divorce/a-legal-guide-domestic-asset-protection-trusts-divorce 
[perma.cc/LZ3C-VXAF] ( last visited July 16, 2017). 
242. Brown & Mead, supra note 178. 
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substantially similar notice.243 The statue directs that any letter of notice contain the 
following language, in capital letters and at the top of the letter: 
YOUR SPOUSE IS CREATING A PERMANENT TRUST INTO 
WHICH PROPERTY IS BEING TRANSFERRED. YOUR RIGHTS 
TO THIS PROPERTY MAY BE AFFECTED DURING YOUR 
MARRIAGE, UPON DIVORCE (INCLUDING THE PAYMENT OF 
CHILD SUPPORT OR ALIMONY OR A DIVISION OR 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY IN A DIVORCE), OR AT THE 
DEATH OF YOUR SPOUSE.244  
The notice must also describe the property being transferred.245 The spouse 
may request a copy of the trust document and is advised to seek independent legal 
counsel.246 Failure to object after notice is construed as consent.247 Amending the 
rule and requiring affirmative consent as the default would further improve fairness 
between spouses and enhance partnership rules. Without written consent, no 
transfers of marital property made unilaterally into a DAPT during marriage—not 
just those made in anticipation of divorce—should receive asset protection.  
These rules would not preclude spouses from using DAPTs or even from 
creating them during marriage. It would only prevent secret transfers into trust with 
marital property. With notice and consent, spouses should be free to manage their 
assets as they see fit, and a recent DAPT case from Nevada demonstrates this 
principle in action. The spouses in Klabacka v. Nelson married in 1983, signed a 
separate property agreement (SPA) in 1993, transmuting their community assets 
into separate property, and in 2001 funded two separate self-settled asset protection 
trusts, each with the separate assets of one spouse.248 As the court  
remarked: “Suffice it to say, the parties have substantial trust issues.”249 
Nevertheless, both parties were aware of the transactions and not only did both 
parties consult counsel prior but the wife also consulted additional outside counsel 
prior to her signing.250  
At divorce, the wife argued that the trusts were not validly created and that 
the SPA did not hold at divorce. The court disagreed, referencing the ongoing 
consent both parties had given and the knowledge both had about the management 
of their wealth.251 This case highlights that partnership entails conversation, notice, 
and consent—not necessarily asset sharing. Partnership encompasses the right of 
 
243. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-15(2)(b). 
244. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55 16-15(3)(a); Codified Laws, S.D. LEGISLATURE, http://
www.sdlegislature.gov/Statutes/Codified_Laws/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=55-16-1
5 [perma.cc/MB3L-2WAH]. No notice is required for separate property. 
245.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-15(3)(b). 
246.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-15(3)(a). 
247. Id. 
248. Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 943 (Nev. 2017). 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. (concluding that if, through tracing, any community property was in either trust the 
district court was to make an equal distribution of that community property). 
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spouses to engage in private ordering and asks only that these private arrangements 
be agreed upon mutually, after discussion and consultation. 
3. Quasi-Marital Property: Minding One’s Own Business? 
To add another layer of protection to marital property rights, one spouse 
would not only be required to provide notice to the other when creating or 
transferring marital assets into a DAPT but also when transferring separate 
property. In some states—Alaska, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, and 
Wyoming—a settlor looking to create a DAPT must provide a sworn affidavit 
stating that he has full rights and title to the trust property and, therefore, unfettered 
authority to create a trust with the assets.252 Furthermore, it is standard practice for 
estate planners to ensure that a settlor holds full and clear title to the property being 
transferred into trust. Nevertheless, these kinds of measures are not always 
sufficient to protect against the transfer of quasi-marital property into a DAPT. As 
such, specific additional measures are needed to protect spousal rights in property 
that might technically be the separate property of one spouse during the marriage 
but that might be quasi-marital at divorce because of the active contributions of the 
non-owner spouse.253  
This kind of problem arises most commonly with assets subject to an increase 
in value because of spousal contributions. A family business or personal business 
interest is the classic example and one that appears repeatedly in the caselaw. In 
Dahl, for example, the husband funded the Nevada DAPT with his interest in the 
real estate investment company that he owned.254 In Kloiber, the husband transferred 
99.45% of the shares of Exstream Software, Inc., a document management 
company that he founded with a friend, for an unsecured promissory note with a 
face amount of $6 million.255 The trust then sold the shares for over $300 million 
dollars. In both cases, the husbands had the ability to transfer shares because they 
were technically separate property when the trust was funded. Nevertheless, in both 
cases, there was a significant possibility that any increase in value to the company 
was marital property.  
This same problem arises both at death and divorce. In In re Estate of Littleton, 
for example, husband and wife were married for thirty-six years at the time of the 
husband’s death. Five years before he died, the husband transferred the bulk of his 
assets, consisting mostly of rental property, into a trust. The trust terms provided 
that the wife receive “personal items, home furnishings and the monthly cash sum 
of $4,000.00 for her lifetime.”256 Unhappy with this outcome, the wife chose to 
assert her elective share rights, alleging that her share was $1.2 million, a sum she 
 
252. See Amundsen, supra note 218.  
253. This problem is obviated by community property rules. I assume in this discussion that we 
are talking about separate property states.  
254. Dahl v. Dahl, 345 P.3d 566, 576 (Utah 2015). 
255. In re Kloiber, 98 A.3d 924, 932 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
256. In re Estate of Littleton, 313 P.3d 1062, 1064 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013). 
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produced by including the value of one particular car lot she claimed was marital 
property. The court, then, had to determine whether the car lot property was “joint 
industry during coverture ( JIDC) property,”257 a form of marital property. Evidence 
showed that the husband had acquired the car lot before marriage. However, the 
court observed, the wife “may have acquired an interest in the enhanced value of 
Decedent’s separate property through either Decedent’s or her efforts, skills or funds 
during the marriage.”258 The court consequently remanded the case for further 
proceedings to inquire into the wife’s contributions.  
In these situations, an affidavit stating the husband had all rights to the 
property would not have caught the quasi-marital nature of the property being 
transferred. Notice of the transfer to the spouse would, on the other hand, help 
ensure the knowledge as well as the consent of the non-owner spouse. Notice, then, 
should be sent to the spouse when separate, not just marital, property is being 
transferred into a DAPT. Notice would help increase transparency about the ways 
in which assets are managed within marriage and could help prevent secret transfers 
of special assets like business shares. To compound protections afforded by notice 
requirements, these special assets—like family businesses—should be subject to 
scrutiny at divorce to help ensure that marital property is not inappropriately 
sheltered from a spouse who contributed to its value. 
In order to better actualize economic partnership, spouses should be informed 
about asset transfers of not just marital but also separate property, particularly 
separate property that is subject to appreciation in value. In some cases, the property 
will legitimately be separate property, but the harm of providing additional 
information to a spouse is much less—and of a different order—than the harm of 
secrecy. 
4. Protecting the Margins 
Finally, because economic partnerships do not necessarily begin at the actual 
moment of marriage, there should be look-back periods to ensure that one spouse 
did not transfer assets into trust the day before the wedding in a “romantic” attempt 
to shelter wealth. This is particularly important because many couples begin to 
commingle funds and engage in joint financial planning once they agree to marry 
but prior to the actual marriage. 
Other areas of law provide models for look-back periods, designed with a 
similar intention—to uncover sham transfers made with the intent to defraud. The 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) includes in the decedent’s gross estate certain 
transfers made within three years of the death for purposes of wealth transfer 
 
257. Id. at 1065 (The court began its analysis stating: “When a court is asked to determine 
whether property is separate or marital, the same rules apply whether the issue is raised in a divorce or 
upon the death of a spouse”). 
258. Id. at 1066. 
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taxation.259 Medicaid has a five-year look-back period and individuals seeking 
eligibility must disclose all financial transactions they were involved in during a 
period of five years prior to application to determine whether the applicant 
transferred any assets for less than fair market value.260 Finally, in bankruptcy law, 
there is a two-year look-back period meant to reveal fraudulent transfers, in which 
the property owner transfers property at less than fair market value or transfers 
assets into trust in order to keep them out of the bankruptcy proceedings.261  
This same principle should also apply in the context of self-settled trusts and 
marriage—and does in some states. In Michigan, Hawaii, and Alaska, if the trust 
was created within thirty days of the marriage, the trust assets can only be “shielded 
against any property settlement if the settlor provides written notice to the spouse 
of such funding.”262 This approach shields the non-wealth holding spouse from 
unilateral action during wedding planning and preparation, and is an approach all 
DAPT states should adopt. Taking this concept further, states could also extend the 
timeframe from the one month immediately preceding marriage to the entire period 
in which a couple is planning and preparing for marriage. While it would not always 
be easy to determine at what point notification would be required, at the very least 
notification of the soon-to-be spouse could be required if the couple has become 
engaged and is planning to be married.263 Instituting this kind of look-back period 
indexed to engagement would mean that individuals using DAPTs as pre-nuptial 
agreements would be either forced to disclose the creation of a trust in anticipation 
of marriage or to create the trust early enough that there would be no possible fraud 
or unwarranted secrecy. 
To ensure that DAPTs are not merely vehicles for asset sheltering and that 
they serve a legitimate purpose, DAPT states should make sure that economic 
partnership rules balance out the enormous power of wealth preservation that these 
trusts currently enable.264  
 
 
259. Under § 2036 (transfers with retained life estate), § 2037 (transfers taking effect at death), 
§2038 (revocable transfers), or § 2042 (life insurance). 
260. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A). 
261. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the look back period is two years. 11 U.S.C. § 548. However, 
many states have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), which allows creditors to look 
back four years to find a fraudulent conveyance. 
262. Brown & Mead, supra note 175, at 3. 
263. There is a difficult question here of where to draw the line. However, since the focus here 
is marriage planning and marriage settlements, an apt line to draw is at engagement, when there is a 
clear agreement between the individuals and an intention to be married. Of course, this might provide 
incentives to skip the engagement before the marriage, but this is still the likely better approach than 
using either an arbitrary measure of time or delving into questions of nonmarital partnership.  
264. Rules developed more generally to instantiate partnership for trusts should still apply as 
well. Spouses should, aligned with Uniform Trust Code rules, be considered exception creditors. See 
discussion infra. 
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CONCLUSION 
Family wealth preservation was the longstanding rule of law in marriage. Only 
recently have norms changed and, as the idea of marital partnership has gained 
traction, the spouse has moved from the shadows of the dower house into the 
spotlight. While the idea of economic partnership in marriage has become 
increasingly accepted, however, family wealth preservation norms persist. Current 
marriage law accommodates the goals of both wealth preservation and economic 
partnership by allowing for various forms of wealth preservation but limiting these 
forms mostly to third-party interventions, based on the notion of freedom of 
disposition. Now, new marriage trusts threaten to undo this carefully composed 
arrangement by giving robust asset protection to spouses who create self-settled 
trusts during or in anticipation of marriage. Providing new and unparalleled 
opportunities for one spouse to shelter assets and defraud the other spouse of 
marital property, these new trust forms disrupt the ecology of marital sharing and 
financial collaboration, enabling family wealth preservation to annex economic 
partnership terrain. Consequently, a renewed focus on rules that limit the ability of 
spouses to act unilaterally in marriage to shelter assets and conceal information will 
help correct the growing imbalance between the competing value-spheres. Without 
a course correction, inequities in the marriage economy will burgeon as marriage 
rules absorb family wealth preservation rules, rendering spouses as obstacles and 
irritants in the great project of wealth transfer and legacy building.  
 
